Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq? by Tiefer, Charles
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
Summer 2006
Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from
Iraq?
Charles Tiefer
University of Baltimore School of Law, ctiefer@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, Military,
War, and Peace Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq? 42 Stan. J. Int'l L. 291 (2006)
CAN ApPROPRIATION RIDERS SPEED 
OUR EXIT FROM IRAQ? 
By CHARLES TIEFER • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If the President loses centrist American political support for continuing 
the war in Iraq, members of Congress might employ their most legally potent, 
yet controversial, tool to speed our exit, or at least to change policy. Namely, 
they can attach conditions-typically in the form of provisions added to the 
war funding and Iraq aid appropriations, known as "riders" because of how 
they "ride" on the underlying bill-pushing the military ground combat 
operations toward an earlier exit. I 
Congress enacts an appropriation bill for funding the continuation of 
the Iraq war at least once every year and also enacts funding bills for military 
training, reconstruction, and other aid for the government of Iraq.2 
Congressional procedure allows proponents of policy changes to offer riders 
for these funding bills. Sponsors started pushing certain riders in 2003 to 
convert Iraq reconstruction aid3 into World Bank loans instead of grants: in 
spring 2005 to forbid torture or inhuman treatment of detainees/ and in 
Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; B.A., summa cum laude, Columbia 
College 1974; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School 1977. The author appreciates the 
assistance of William C. Banks, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher, Michael Glennon, Peter Raven-
Hansen, and George Van Cleve, and of his research assistants Melyssa Morey and Andrea King. 
The responsibility for all views and errors is my own. 
I For general treatments of the subject, see WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1994); STEPHEN DYCUS, 
ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (3d ed. 2002); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 
(2d ed. 2004); THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS (2d ed. 1993); MICHAEL 
GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996) (all documenting and analyzing the historic 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the context of war-making 
powers). 
2 The Open Society publishes Iraq's budget online. Iraq Revenue Watch, Monitoring Iraq 
Reconstruction Funds, Contracts, Oil, http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org (last visited March 22, 
2006). For a prediction of the large future expenses for training Iraqi security forces, see Rick 
Maze, War Costs May Surpass $500 Billion, Report Warns, ARMy TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at 11. 
3 Aid began at the time of occupation. See generally, James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and 
Other Economic Rights Upon Conquest and Under Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and 
Historical Perspective, 25 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 491 (2004); John Yoo, Iraq Reconstruction 
and the Law of Occupation, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL 'y 7 (2004) (treating generally the 
legal situation of occupied Iraq). 
4 CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT 210-23 (2004). 
5 Eric Lichtblau, Congress Adopts Restriction on Treatment of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 11, 2005, at A16. This provision is discussed in Part IV.A.l, infra. For general 
background, see, for example, Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 
(2005). 
291 
42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 291 (2006) 
292 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42:291 
summer 2005 for troop withdrawals from Iraq.6 The Iraq-policy riders of 2003 
and 2005 did not pass, and only the "McCain Amendment" rider about 
detainee treatment did. 7 Nevertheless, these early efforts highlighted that this 
was one procedural way in which a portion of the majority party in Congress, 
representing districts and states insistent upon a different Iraq policy, could 
join with the minority party on moderate proposals that affect wartime policy.8 
Even a congressional majority party leadership supporting the President, 
although able to fend off most other efforts to change Iraq policies 
legislatively, may not be able to prevent the offering and passage of Iraq 
appropriation riders.9 
To illustrate its points concretely, this Article explores the issues 
surrounding Iraq riders using three examples, each of which raises a different 
kind of dispute. The hypothetical riders consist of two war funding riders, 
regarding withdrawal and policy respectively, and an aid rider regarding Iraqi 
governance. The focus of this Article is not the undoubtedly interesting policy 
and political issues raised by such riders, but rather the constitutional debate 
over the powers of the Congress and the President. During and after 
congressional consideration of such riders, the riders' proponents will base 
Congress' right to affect wartime policy via appropriation riders upon the 
plenary nature,IO venerable history, II and contemporary significancel2 of 
Congress' power of the purse.13 Conversely, the riders' o~ponents will raise, in 
addition to policy and political contentions, a classic 4 and contemporaryl5 
6 151 CONGo REc. H4767-68 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (section (a) of the Pelosi 
Amendment). 
7 Detainee Treatment Act of2005, Pub. L. 109-148, § 801, 119 Stat. 2739, 2744 (2005). 
8 See. e.g., Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REv. 2673, 2678 (2005) (examining the procedures and practices of Congress). 
9 See, e.g., CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 987 (1989) 
(discussing the abortion and other limitation riders that threatened to take control of the House 
floor in the early 1980s). 
JO Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 
758 (1989) (discussing the constitutionality of legislative control over foreign affairs in the 
context of the Iran-Contra affair); Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers 
Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REv. I (1975) (suggesting a 
constitutional basis for strengthening Congress' powers in the context of Vietnam); Raoul 
Berger, War-Making Power of the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 78-79 (1972) (same). 
II See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and 
Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035 (1986) (discussing Congress' historical and 
constitutional authority to authorize private forces to fight on behalf of the United States). 
12 FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWTN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE 
WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (2d ed. 1989) (discussing congressional and 
executive war-making from the founding through Vietnam). 
13 Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) (describing the 
contours of Congress' power of the purse). 
14 Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 
693 (1990) (suggesting that executive war-making power faced an increasing threat of 
legislative intrusion); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
1162 (discussing the limits of congressional appropriations and the extent of executive spending 
power). 
15 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167 (1996) (analyzing modern war powers 
from an originalist perspective). 
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argument of maximal presidential war powersl6 that disputes the legitimacy of 
changing policy through riders. They will arguel7 from the President's own 
textual authority as Commander in Chief in an authorized, legal warlS and will 
cite past presidential pronouncements. 19 They will also invoke the more 
general "executive power" clause.2o The Justice Department adumbrated such 
arguments in 2006 in a legal memorandum supporting the President's wartime 
power to authorize warrantless eavesdropping of communications to the United 
States, although that eavesdropping would be proscribed by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. 21 
While even supporters of presidential power would concede that 
Congress could plainly and simply cut off funds for the war22-that is, stop 
funding and thereby require a total and abrupt (if funds run out rapidly) 
withdrawal-Congress will be loath to take that step. Conditions, by contrast 
with cutoffs, impose measured schedules and relatively nuanced policy 
changes rather than totally and abruptly stopping the funding. The President's 
supporters would treat Congress' use of conditions, not cutoffs, as a reversion 
to what they would deem President-doubting, congressional-micromanaging 
syndromes after the Vietnam War and Iran-Contra, assertedly23 out ofplace24 in 
16 See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and 
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1364 
(1994) (examining limits on congressional war-making power and executive authority to 
override Congress); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991) (outlining the 
contextual factors that merit a congressional declaration of war, in the context of the Gulf War). 
17 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639 
(2002) (offering textual support for a flexible view of the President's war-making powers as an 
alternative to a "pro-Congress" position). 
IS By "legal war" I mean (sufficient) authorization by Congress. The interesting question 
of the war's status in international law is a separate matter. See, e.g., Mahmoud Hmoud, The 
Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and Security Council Resolution 1483,36 CORN. INT'L 
L.J. 435 (2004) (rejecting the United States arguments for the legality of the war); Sean D. 
Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004) (fmding the 
justification of the United States attack on Iraq in terms of Security Council resolutions dating 
back to the invasion of Kuwait unpersuasive); Robert F. Turner, Operation Iraqi Freedom: 
Legal and Policy Considerations, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 765 (2004) (justifying the attack 
on Iraq as consistent with the United Nations Charter and international law); A. Mark Weisburd, 
The War in Iraq and the Dilemma of Controlling the International Use of Force, 39 TEX. INT'L 
L.J. 521, 522 (2004) (arguing attack on Iraq was a violation of United Nations Charter). 
19 Executive pronouncements are collected in Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The 
President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist 
Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 488 
(2002). Although many of those statements occurred in contexts in which they did not justify a 
challenged executive intervention, some did. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE 
LEGAL ADVISER, THE LEGALITY OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIETNAM, 112 
CONGo REc. 5504 (1966). 
20 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (making a constitutional case for a strong unitary executive); 
Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review 
Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 903 (1994) (offering 
historical support for broad deference to the President in matters considered executive). 
21 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorit ies.pdf. 
22 Even strong believers in Presidential power would let Congress prevent or stop an 
intervention by denying it funding. John C. Y 00, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral 
Future, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673, 1704 (2000). 
23 But see David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress and the Use of Force: Legal 
and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 
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the post-9/11 world. 25 In addition, presidential supporters would counter 
Congress' authority to place terms on appropriations by citing both case law26 
and commentary27 about the "unconstitutional conditions,,28 doctrine.29 
The next Part of this Article begins with general background30 and 
consideration of the presidential and congressional positions in constitutional 
debates and actions regarding Iraq war riders. The Article moves from English 
and colonial history to the most important congressional actions in the recent 
past. In particular, the Article discusses congressional actions regarding the 
Vietnam War3l in the 1970s32 and the conflict J3 over the Boland Amendments34 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (2002) (discussing how actual compromise on the September 14, 2001 
resolution moderated presidential power). 
24 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047 (2005) (implicitly responding to the Vietnam 
syndrome by fmding the post-9I11 congressional resolution a wide-open blank check for 
presidential use of force); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 19 at 491-92 (rejecting the view, much 
accepted after the Vietnam War, that only Congress can authorize war). 
25 Vice President Dick Cheney has been a major voice in arguing against congressional 
restriction of presidential war powers, and has naturally urged this in the post-9/11 period. Bob 
Woodward, Cheney Upholds Power of the Presidency: Vice President Praises Bush as Strong, 
Decisive Leader Who Has Helped Restore Office, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,2005, at A07. 
26 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 307 (1946) (demonstrating counsel's 
unsuccessful defense of the challenged provision as an exercise of Congress' appropriation 
power); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1872) (challenged proviso was in 
appropriation). 
27 Executive branch supporters apply the term to appropriation limitations that assertedly 
infringe on the President's constitutional authority. H. Jefferson Powell, The President's 
Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
527,551-54 (1999); William H. Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative 
and the Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599,612 (1916). 
28 "A series of attorney general opinions, and the concept of unconstitutional conditions, 
refute the notion that the appropriations power can be a valid basis for broad congressional 
claims of absolute plenary authority." John Norton Moore, Do We Have An Imperial 
Congress?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 139,145--46 (1988) (footnotes omitted). 
29 The common and accepted application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
concerns individuals' entitlement to receive government benefits without having to accept the 
condition of surrendering their constitutional rights. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (1989); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal 
Spending & the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1120-23 (1987) (considering the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as covering a broad range of privilege recipients, public 
and private); John D. French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234, 236-
239 (1961). 
30 Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. 
L. REv. 1771 (1968) (comparing congressional and presidential war-making powers in the 
context of Vietnam). 
3l John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality 
of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1990) (discussing the constitutionality 
of the war in Indochina in retrospect). 
32 John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the 
War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1990) (further discussion of the 
constitutionality of the war in Indochina). 
33 Even before the Contra issues, in 1979-84, I served as assistant Senate legal counsel 
and had the opportunity informally to assist the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when it 
made the key decisions about authorizing the Lebanon intervention of 1983 that became the 
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-1119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983). See 
CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY 123-24 (1994); Note, The Future of the 
War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1407,1425 n.199 (1984). 
34 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFF AJR (1990) (highlighting the ways in which the breakdown in the 
distribution of constitutional authority led to the Iran-Contra crisis). 
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during the Iran-Contra controversy in the mid-1980s,35 which, among others,36 I 
was privileged to see37 during my time inside Congress. 38 
Further illumination as to war powers has continued since then,39 in the 
course of the military interventions of the administrations40 of President George 
H. W. Bush41 and President Clinton42 from the mid-1990s43 to the 1999 bombing 
campaign44 in Kosovo and Serbia:5 As for conditions on aid to allied 
governments facing insurgencies, the Central American aid provisions of the 
1980s provide some key insights:6 
35 G. Hr. Wolohojian, Note, The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88 
COLUM. L. REv. 1534 (1988) (arguing in the context of Iran-Contra that judicial deference to 
the executive on matters of foreign affairs should not apply to statutory interpretation). 
36 As Solicitor of the House of Representatives from 1984-95, I personally represented the 
House of Representatives in a number of constitutional cases on national security. See, e.g., 
Am. Foreign Servo Ass'n V. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 13 (1989) (vacating ruling striking down as 
unconstitutional a classified information provision in an appropriation bill), on remand, 732 F. 
Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1990). For a previous article drawing on my role as congressional counsel, 
see Charles Tiefer, The FAS Proposal: Valid Check or Unconstitutional Veto? in FIRST USE OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES? (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 
1987), reprinted in FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 1, at 728-32. 
37 As Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House Iran-Contra Committee, 1 co-authored 
the chapter in the committee report on the Boland Amendments. Report of the Congressional 
Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, S. REp. NO. 216, H.R. REp. NO. 100-433 
(1987). For a previous discussion drawing on that service, see George W. Van Cleve & Charles 
Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of Use Immunity and Secret International Enterprises in Major 
Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 Mo. L. REv. 43 (1990). 
38 I filed the amicus brief for the House Leadership Group. Am. Foreign Servo Ass'n V. 
Garfmkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989). The brief addressed the constitutionality of the appropriation 
rider in that case, while also arguing the mootness issue that the Court accepted. The issues 
were nicely treated in Michael Glennon, Publish and Perish: Congress's Effort to Snip Snepp, 
Before and AFSA, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 163 (1989). 
39 See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Declarations of War, 37 u.c. DAVIS L. REv. 321 
(2003) (providing a survey of how modern presidential announcements of commitment of U.S. 
forces have amounted to--in defmition and function-formal declarations of war). 
40 For a strong criticism of presidential claims to war powers culminating in criticisms of 
both the Bush and Clinton administrations' positions, see Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential 
Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1637 (2000). 
41 CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY (1994), supra note 33, at 119-36 
(especially Chapter 6, The Persian Gulf War Authorization). 
42 Lori Fisler Darnrosch, The Clinton Administration and War Powers, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 131-41 (2000) (providing an overview of the contributions of the 
Clinton administration to the war powers debate). 
43 Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late I990s by Partial Congressional Declaration, 
36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1,9-16 (1999). 
44 Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers 
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1149, 1154-55 (2001) (arguing that the Kosovo bombing 
campaign revealed a constitutional inadequacy of the War Powers Resolution in relation to such 
controversies ). 
45 Charles Tiefer, Adjustable Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-Executive 
Controversies About International Organizations, 35 TEx. INT'L LJ. 239, 255-57 (2000) 
(noting that Kosovo and Serbia bombing campaign fits other aspects of congressional-executive 
controversies ). 
46 See generally Jeffrey A. Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 
YALE. J. INT'L L. 69 (1988) (analyzing congressional conditions on aid to Central American 
nations facing insurgencies in the 1980s such as EI Salvador; the significance for conditions on 
aid to Iraq as it faces its insurgency is discussed in Part IV.B.2, infra 63-69). 
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The next Parts turn to the specific arguments about three particular 
rider types:7 Part III turns to the single most important Iraq rider type, the 
"withdrawal" rider. A "withdrawal" rider would provide funding only if there 
is a plan under implementation for withdrawing American ground combat 
forces by a set deadline. This involves the ultimate issues of reducing 
American war involvement from full to limited. Such a rider fmds its 
analogies in the time and scope limits of the Vietnam War,48 and in the 
Supreme Court cases upholding congressional power to define wars as 
limited.49 
Other arguments about war funding riders receive separate 
consideration in Part IV. A bipartisan majority in Congress may also use 
riders to change policysO regarding particular aspects of the war. The main 
example used here is a rider reducing the combat exposure of reservistsSI to 
preserve the reserve and National Guard system with its important 
responsibilities in both foreign and (as Hurricane Katrina reminded us) 
domestic affairs.s2 Supporters of presidential power may resist such a rider.s3 
While no example will perfectly predict the legal and political questions that 
may arise, analysis of any war policy example shows how such issues vary 
from those that the Supreme Court has resolved in pase4 or current confiicts/s 
47 See Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass; What Abortion Teaches Us About 
American Politics, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 293,325-26 (1994) (discussing abortion riders); Louis 
Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal 
Practices, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 51, 67-81 (1979). 
48 See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare 
War: A Requiemfor Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. I (1972) (concluding that the President acted 
illegally after the repeal of the Tonkin Resolution). 
49 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 169 (1804) (holding that a captain of a vessel follows 
instructions from the President at his peril and that if those instructions are not strictly 
warranted by law he will be legally liable for the consequences); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1,7, 
15,31 (1801) (discussing Congress' legislating and how it controls the law of salvage); Bas v. 
Tingy,4 U.S. 37 (1800) (discussing Congress' powers to make and limit wars). 
so Classic studies of policy riders are Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies 
Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456 (1987) (arguing that the appropriations process 
is not the appropriate place for substantive policymaking); Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on 
the Use of Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19 
HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 457 (1992) (addressing possible separation of powers limits on the use of 
riders); Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS 
Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360 (1980) (discussing appropriations limitations affecting the IRS's 
ability to enforce the tax code). 
SI Andy P. Fernandez, The Need for the Expansion of Military Reservists' Rights in 
Furtherance of the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the USERRA and ADA, 14 ST. 
THOMAS L. REv. 859 (2002) (concerning reservist-employee rights); John F. Romano, State 
Militias and the United States: Changed Responsibilities for a New Era, 56 A.F. L. REv. 233 
(2005) (discussing how the evolving role of state militias and the National Guard has led to a 
contradiction with the original intent of the framers). See generally Gen. Accounting Office, 
Nat'l Sec. and Int'l Affairs Div., Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Acting and Reserve 
Combat Forces, But Challenges Remain, GAOINSIAD 00-162 (2000) (discussing continuing 
efforts to integrate active reserves and combat forces). 
S2 Gil Grantmore, The Phages of American Law, 36 u.c. DAVIS L. REv. 455, 463-65 
(2003); see generally Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334 (1990) (affmning congressional 
power of the purse). 
S3 See, e.g., Theodore B. Olson, Tex Lezar Memorial Lecture, 9 TEx. REv. L. & POL. I 
(2004) (arguing that the commander-in-chiefpower is not subject to judicial review). 
S4 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 662 (1952) (rejecting Truman's 
claim to have power to take control of factories without congressional authorization). 
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such as those raised in Hamdi56 and Rasul.57 A useful set of criteria may be 
applied to assess such provisions, to determine their intrusiveness into 
command itself, their generality, and the substantiality of their link to funding. 
Congress may add to the aid appropriations conditions to be met by the 
Iraq government. The use of riders would reflect differing views between an 
American public, which places the highest priority on speeding the troops' exit 
from Iraq, and an Iraqi government that represents particular constituencies, 
particularly the majority Shiites, in Iraq's conflict.58 The particular example 
chosen consists of Congress providing, say, a quarter of appropriated aid 
funding only upon certification by our government that Baghdad has made 
progress toward an elevated role for the disaffected Sunni minority that is the 
insurgency's base. 59 
Congress has a history of placing legislative conditions on 
appropriated aid, including aid to regimes allied with us against active or 
potential insurgencies, such as EI Salvador60 and Guatemala,61 and on aid to 
insurgents themselves, such as the Boland Amendments' imposition of terms 
on direct or indirect aid62 to the Nicaraguan Contras.63 Executive supporters 
55 Rasul v. Bush, 542 u.s. 466 (2004) (reversing and remanding a case to grant 
jurisdiction to "enemy combatants" to file a writ of habeas corpus); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004) (concerning the status of an "enemy combatants"); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, 
Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 97 (2004) 
(concluding that the President does not have authority to violate treaties when Congress has 
Article I powers to supersede the treaty); Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 
YALE L. & POL'y REv. 153 (2004) (arguing that an inherent executive power does not exist); 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Comment, A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 Us.c. sec. 4001(A) and the 
Detention of u.s. Citizen "Enemy Combatants," 112 YALE LJ. 961 (2003) (arguing that 
detention of U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants" without charge is illegal). 
56 Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (concerning a United States citizen's right to contest his detention 
as enemy combatant). 
57 Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (concerning the right of those detained at Guantanamo in 
connection with hostilities to contest detention by habeas corpus). 
58 For example, before the war, no one could predict confidently that in the first real 
election, which took place in January 2005, there would be strong Shiite and Kurdish 
participation but much less Sunni participation. 
59 To properly bring the debated issues to the forefront, two assumptions are made about 
the scale of change in Iraqi policy toward the disaffected Sunni minority. On the one hand, it is 
assumed that the American public has lost patience to such an extent as to fuel passage of a 
provision demanding very major change in Iraq policy. On the other hand, it is assumed that 
the amount of change demanded is more than what is agreeable either to the Iraqi government, 
concerned about its Shiite and Kurdish support, or to the President, concerned about using aid 
as a weapon against our wartime ally. These assumptions lead to the question of whether 
Congress' power to act by way of such a rider can constitutionally overcome the President's 
power to decline to implement such a rider. 
60 James W. Moeller, Human Rights and United States Security Assistance: El Salvador 
and the Case for Country-Specific Legislation, 24 HARv. INT'L L.J. 75 (1983) (discussing the 
effectiveness and drawbacks of congressional implementation of human rights funding 
restrictions). 
61 Tanya Broder & Bernard D. Lambek, Military Aid to Guatemala: The Failure of us. 
Human Rights Legislation, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. III (1988) (discussing the failures of 
legislation limiting military aid to Guatemala). 
62 J. Graham Noyes, Comment, Cutting the President Off From Tin Cup Diplomacy, 24 
U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 841 (1991) (arguing against an inherent executive authority to fund foreign 
policy initiatives); Alex Whiting, Note, Controlling Tin Cup Diplomacy, 99 YALE L.J. 2043 
(1990) (arguing that Congress has the power to limit quid pro quo arrangements as well as 
direct funding to executive foreign policy initiatives). 
63 See, e.g., Whiting, supra note 62, at 2044-49 (1990) (concerning practice with respect 
to aiding the Contras). 
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may contend that such a rider interferes with the President's power of 
diplomacy,64 which is particularly strong in wartime. 65 
Though each of the above-mentioned riders should be deemed 
constitutional as it goes through the tortuous enactment process, if such 
provisions actually reach enactment, the President would have new options for 
asserting his power in opposition to them. Part V 6 applies recent history about 
presidential signing statements that purport to brush aside provisions like 
these,67 and presidential interpretation and implementation of such provisions 
that greatly minimize them.68 The President adumbrated such a step by his 
signing statement on the McCain Amendment regarding detainee treatment. 69 
Anticipation of the President's attempts to avoid being bound by riders may 
inspire legislators to craft provisions that close loopholes and include standards 
and watchdog elements. 
This Article's conclusion discusses why congressional efforts to be 
involved in war policy, even with all its frustrations and limitations, are, 
nevertheless, important to democracy. Congress can both authorize a limited 
war and redefine its limits, and can do so through conditions in funding 
appropriation. 
II. BACKGROUND TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON IRAQ WAR 
APPROPRIATION PROVISIONS 
A. Original Intent 
Textually, and as a matter of original intent, Congress has plenary 
power over war appropriations, which presumably includes the power to give 
directions on the use of those funds. 70 Article I of the u.s. Constitution spells 
out Congress' appropriations power far more powerfully than most of 
Congress' other powers. Article I, section 8, clause 12 provides "That the 
Congress shall have Power .... To raise and support Armies, but no 
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two 
Years." Article I, section 9, clause 7 provides that "No Money shall be drawn 
64 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
65 Id. at 320 ("[H]e, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions 
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time ofwar."). 
66 Christopher A. Ford, War Powers as We Live Them: Congressional Executive Bargaining 
Under the Shadow of the War Powers Resolution, II J.L. & POL. 609 (1995). 
67 See generally Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks 
on Executive Abuse, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983) (discussing when, in general, a President can 
trump a provision in this way); Christine E. Burgess, Note, When Maya President Refuse to 
Enforce the Law?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 631 (1994) (same). 
68 See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1,34-35 (1994) (noting that 
conditions are part of consent to spending the funding, but analyzing the issue of so-called 
"extraneous" conditions). 
69 Statement on Signing H.R. 2863, The Department of Defense, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic 
Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. DOC. 1917, 1919 (Dec. 30,2005). 
70 See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424-27 (1990) (fmding 
extensive power of Congress over appropriations, in a case concerning spending for former 
military personnel). 
2006 Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq? 299 
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.,,71 On 
the other hand, Article II, section 2, clause I, provides that "The President shall 
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States .... " 
And, Article II, section I, clause I, begins with "The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America." 
In terms of original intent, both the wording of the text and the 
documents of the Framers' era invoke strong elements of English and colonial 
traditions of vesting the power of the purse in the legislature, particularly as to 
the terms of war funding. The historic conflict between the Stuart monarchs 
and the House of Commons that led to these clauses specifically concerned the 
legislative right to decide the terms and conditions for spending revenue upon 
war.72 The English Bill of Rights memorialized the Commons' victory and 
prefigured the U.S. Constitution in declaring that "levying money for or to the 
use of the Crowne by pretence of prerogative without grant of Parlyament for 
longer time or in other manner then the same is or shall be granted is illegal.,,73 
And, "[t]he raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdome in time of 
peace unlesse it be with consent ofparlyament, is against law.,,74 
Meanwhile, the same era laid the foundation for the modest original 
intent of the Commander in Chief clause. In 1641, Parliament brought on the 
English Civil War by conferring control of the standing army on the Earl of 
Essex, who was under parliamentary authority, rather than leaving it with 
Charles 1. 75 After the Restoration, Parliament maintained its control of the 
purse over troop deployments. A 1678 act required that the funds granted be 
used to disband the forces stationed in Flanders.76 Parliament let the King 
regain supreme command. In the 1700s, supreme command shifted from the 
King to the Cabinet.77 However, in no way did the return of supreme command 
to the King confine or dilute Parliament's established power to control the 
limits of war by placing conditions upon the revenues needed for war. 
In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton gave his famous explanation of 
the limited authority of the Commander in Chief. Whereas in England the 
monarchy had the power to declare war, under the Constitution the Congress 
would have that power: 
The President is to be Commander-in-chief of the army and 
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would 
be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, 
71 See id. at 424 (discussing section 9, clause 7). 
72 Gerhard Casper, Appropriations of Power, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1,3-5 
(1990). 
73 Francis L. Coolidge Jr. & Joel David Sharrow, Note, The War-Making Powers: The 
Intentions of the Framers in the Light of Parliamentary History, 50 B.U. L. REv. 5, 8 (1970) 
(quoting 1 w. & M. sess. 2, c. w. (1688» (spelling in original). Note the nuances in the phrase 
"for longer time or in other manner," which bar the executive from taking a legislative 
authorization and stripping off the attached riders. Although the provision speaks about the 
legislative revenue-raising action, of course it included spending as well. 
74 /d. at 9. 75 
Id. 
76 GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 1, at 287. 
77 Coolidge & Sharrow, supra note 73, at 10. 
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but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to 
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the 
military and naval forces, as fIrst general and admiral of the 
Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the 
declaring of war, and to the raising, and regulating of fleets 
and armies; all which, by the Constitution under consideration, 
would appertain to the Legislature. 78 
42:291 
The Framers seem to have intended the commander-in-chief clause to avoid 
the excesses of the Continental Congress, which, during the Revolutionary 
War, had meddled in such "supreme command and direction of the military 
and naval forces.,,79 When even the executive-minded Hamilton assured that 
Congress' powers would include "the raising and regulating of fleets and 
armies," nothing could have been further from the Framers' minds than to 
undo the purse-string control achieved by Parliament over the Stuart monarchs 
more than a century earlier. So the relatively limited meaning of the 
commander-in-chief clause, as the Supreme Court has commented, is this: "As 
commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and 
military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the 
manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the 
enemy.,,80 
It was difficult enough for the Framers to persuade the states in the late 
1780s to place the powers to raise and spend revenue on the national 
government's military beyond the states' own control.8! Instead, the Framers 
put their trust in Congress' use of the power of the purse to limit war and bring 
about policy changes and peace.82 
78 THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 6 (Alexander Hamilton). 
79 Id. See generally RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789 
(1987); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1996); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN 
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1979) (all discussing the forming of 
the Constitution). 
80 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850). 
81 In other contexts, executive supporters have argued that the Constitutional Convention 
reacted against the unrestrained state legislatures of the 1780s and took steps intended to curb 
Congress' powers. However, in this context, there seems to be little or no sign that the 
Convention had a mind to vest power in the President to supersede terms limiting war spending. 
On the contrary, the specific language about spending no money from the Treasury, 
except in consequence of appropriations made by law, came as a series of states put similar 
clauses in their own constitutions. The states did so because "at the same time states enhanced 
executive authority, they reinforced their legislatures' hold on the state fisc, principally by 
proscribing the expenditure of funds except as directed by legislative enactment." Richard D. 
Rosen, Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential 
Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REv. 1,63 (1998). 
To vest the wartime revenue-raising and appropriating in the national government-
without congressional representatives responsible to the people and the states deciding upon the 
conditions to attach to that funding, and instead to place unchecked power in the hands of a 
President remote from the states and somewhat suspected of monarchical potential-could 
never have been their intent. For a discussion of the period from the American Revolution to 
the Constitution, see Casper, supra note 72, at 6-8. 
82 Rosen, supra note 81, at 72-74. 
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B. Practice before World War II 
The more promising arguments by executive supporters look to the 
history of actions by strong Presidents, particularly President Lincoln, and 
those in office during the Cold War, notably Presidents Truman, Johnson, and 
Nixon. 83 However, the actual history does not support the notion that the 
executive's "commander-in-chief' power trumps congressional power of the 
purse. Under President Washington, the government found a balance between 
foreign relations and spending powers. To simplify, the President had his 
power, but the Congress, in its spending authority, had its own final power.84 
In that period, and thereafter, the House generally went along with funding 
what the President wanted in foreign affairs and war, just as Congress has 
continued to usually fund war and foreign policy without restrictive terms or 
conditions.85 
Wars came about, usually by freely made congressional decision, as 
with the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, and World War 1;86 
sometimes by foreign attack, as with World War II; and sometimes by 
executive decisions about committing troops to a locus of potential or actual 
conflict in which battle actually ensued, as with the Mexican War and the 
Korean War. However hostilities started, Congress had the power to use riders 
on military appropriations to decide policy. As with appropriations for treaty 
implementation, Congress typically used military appropriation riders in ways 
that both supported war efforts and kept faith with the rest of national security 
policymaking. 
Before the Vietnam War, there was a history of Congress using, or 
threatening to use, its power to put terms on military wartime appropriations 
when suspicious about the President. Uncovering that history, however, takes 
some digging. 87 In the most historically famous example, during the Mexican 
War, the House twice passed a condition on an appropriation, known as the 
83 Wiliam B. Spong, Jr., Book Note, War Powers of the President and Congress: Who 
Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch?, 68 VA. L. REv. 1437, 1438 (1982) (reviewing book of 
the same title by W. Taylor Reveley (1981». 
84 As to the Jay Treaty, the President (and the Senate) made an enormously important 
treaty with Great Britain, excluding the House from the ratification process, even though 
ratification of the treaty entailed the enactment of appropriations, requiring House approval, for 
implementation. At the time, in partisan terms, the Senate and Presidency were in the process 
of becoming bastions of the Federalist Party, and the House of the other party (later called 
"Democratic-Republican" and then "Democratic") led by Jefferson and Madison. That balance 
left it to the House to decide whether to go along with the Senate and the President to enact 
those appropriations, without any mechanism that could bind, compel, or bypass it to approve 
such appropriations. See Nobleman, infra note 93, at 148--49 (Jay Treaty). For the early history 
of appropriations, see Casper, supra note 72, at 9-21. 
85 Rosen makes a useful comparison, as he researched the history, between congressional 
power in the 1790s and congressional power two centuries later: "The position taken by the 
House of Representatives in April 1796 [about not being obliged to fund the Jay Treaty] has 
prevailed. This is exemplified today by Congress' continuing refusal to appropriate the money 
needed to satisfy dues assessed against the United States under the United Nations Charter, 
although the United States is bound by treaty to pay the dues." Rosen, supra note 81, at 128 
(footnotes omitted). 
86 Some would say that the commencement by Germany of unrestricted submarine warfare 
amounted to the same kind of foreign attack as Pearl Harbor, and similarly forced Congress' 
hand. 
87 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note I, at 380 n.29. 
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"Wilmot Proviso," to bar slavery in territory to be acquired from Mexico.88 
Although the final appropriation law omitted the proviso, the House's passage 
of that proviso signaled that the free states would block slavery in the 
territories while slave states were losing control of Congress. Historians view 
the proviso, and other House pronouncements about the Mexican War,89 as key 
developments that spurred the slave states' doubt about their future in 
Congress and ultimately led, just over a dozen years later, to their choice of 
• 90 
secessIOn. 
The use of riders accelerated during the Civil War.91 Then, by the use 
of such riders on military appropriations, congressional influence 
predominated in Reconstruction; occupation armies implementing 
Reconstruction policies in the Southern states got their directions from such 
riders.92 Congressional influence continued to predominate effectively until the 
I . h 93 ear y twentIet century. 
During President Theodore Roosevelt's administration, Congress and 
the President wrestled for control of the expanded navy. In one notable 
instance, Congress conditioned appropriations on a minimum of eight percent 
of detachments aboard naval vessels being marines. Roosevelt's Attorney 
General conceded the condition's constitutionality, opining that "[C]ongress is 
the sole judge of how the Army or Navy shall be raised and of what it shall be 
composed," and that Congress could condition "that such appropriation [for the 
marines] shall not be available unless the marine corps be employed in some 
designated way.,,94 Roosevelt found ways to stake out his claims to power 
without denying constitutional allocations of authority to Congress. In a 
famous incident, when Congress appropriated less funding than Roosevelt 
needed to send his "Great White Fleet" around the world, he declared he would 
88 Kristian D. Whitten, The Fourteenth Amendment: Justice Bradley's Twentieth Century 
Legacy, 29 CUMBo L. REv. 143, 148 (1999). 
89 See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 381 n.33. 
90 See G. Randal Hornaday, Note, The Forgotten Empire: Pre-Civil War Southern 
Imperialism, 36 CONN. L. REv. 225,253 (2003). 
91 "The great volume of legislation required by the rebellion made this period prolific in 
riders." Alexander Johnston, RIDERS (in u.s. History), in ill CYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL 
SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES By 
THE BEST AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN AUTHORS, 147.7 (John 1. Lalor ed., 1899), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/ToC/0216-03.php (a great source on this subject, virtually unavailable 
until the Internet). 
92 See id. Johnston describes the whole period, rider by rider. The tone was set during the 
military occupation of the South immediately after the Civil War. It took the form of a full-
scale clash between Congress and the President, with the Republican Congress setting policy 
through riders. President Andrew Johnson was impeached for breaching a key one of those 
riders; he escaped conviction in the Senate by a single vote. Johnston recites a fascinating 
account of how, from 1876 on, the fierce struggle over various riders for the army appropriation 
bills marked the end of Reconstruction. Briefer allusions to this occur in Henkin, supra note 1, 
at 380 n.29; Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common Law of Higher 
Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1731, 1763 (1999). 
93 Until Theodore Roosevelt, Congress, also using the Senate's so-called "treaty veto" as 
well as congressional control of appropriations, set the bounds in military and overseas affairs. 
See generally Eli E. Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign 
Relations, 289 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145 (1951) (describing the Senate's 
"treaty veto" and appropriations as dual means for congressional participation in foreign 
relations). 
94 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 259, 260 (1909). 
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send it halfway,9S obliging Congress to appropriate additional funds to bring it 
back.96 
Perhaps the most momentous war-related condition97 of the twentieth 
century prior to the Cold War occurred in 1940. At a time when the public 
largely wished to avoid involvement in the European war, President Franklin 
Roosevelt had staked his ability to act on a distinction between steps he would 
take for preparedness and steps that would be taken for military intervention 
overseas, which he pledged to avoid. Roosevelt succeeded in getting the 
nation's first peacetime draft through Congress by the bare margin of a single 
vote in the House, only by accepting a famous condition that no draftees be 
stationed outside of the Western Hemisphere or the territories and possession 
of the United States.98 Roosevelt may not have completely abided by the 
condition, but his general acceptance of it expressed deference to Congress in 
its setting of limits on the use of the military. 99 
C. Practice since World War II 
After World War II, during the Cold War, Presidents Truman, 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, to varying extents, demonstrated that they 
would make their own unilateral decisions on commitments abroad and on use 
of force. The Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the commitments 
that evolved into the Vietnam War, were primarily presidential rather than 
congressional decisions. Congress did not effectively curb presidential war 
initiation by resort to any of its powers, including appropriations conditions, 
until the 1970s. 
Nonetheless, that did not mean the complete atrophy of congressional 
influence over foreign affairs via the appropriations power during the period 
from World War II to the Vietnam War. Rather, starting with the Marshall 
Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the United States made its great tool in winning 
and sustaining allies through the provision of foreign aid, both military and 
non-military. Establishing the foreign aid programs and deciding on their 
funding became a major congressional task and eventually a fertile field for 
congressional legislating and conditioning-something of a forerunner to the 
reconstruction aid for Iraq. 
9S Henry B. Gonzalez, The Relinquishment of Co-Equality by Congress, 29 HARV. 1. ON 
LEGIS. 33 I, 336 (I 992). 
96 Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. 
L. REv. 1771, 1801 (1968). 
97 This particular condition was not an appropriation rider, but rather was placed on the 
authorization legislation for the draft. Technically, it could be dismissed for that reason as 
irrelevant to an analysis of appropriation riders. History, however, singled out this momentous 
legislation to serve as the vehicle for a condition restraining the President from making a 
controversial use of his draftees. 
98 Selective Training and Service Act, ch. 720, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 885, 886 (1940). 
99 Charles 1. Cooper, Comment, Symposium: A Constitutional Bicentennial Celebration of 
the Imperial Presidency, 47 MD. L. REv. 84, 97 n.44 (1987). Former Assistant Attorney 
General Cooper, in a historically learned essay, notes that Roosevelt sent troops to Greenland 
and Iceland despite the latter being outside the Western Hemisphere. Id. This was indeed a 
violation of the letter of the condition, but was not seen at the time as a serious violation of its 
spirit, as the Iceland occupation kept near the balance of defensive preparations rather than 
interventionist action. 
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The later part of the Vietnam War marked a historic turning point, with 
Congress seeking to regain control of war action via appropriations riders. 
This Article will discuss below the specifics of the Vietnam War's 
appropriation scope limits and fund cutoffs. Speaking broadly, a congressional 
backlash started in the early 1970s against what the nation saw as the "imperial 
presidency" of the Cold War. 'OO Sharp policy disputes were often resolved by 
votes on appropriation riders. For example, the next area for potential covert 
armed intervention abroad after the fall of Vietnam turned out to be Angola. 
Congress, however, enacted the Clark Amendment-a condition on 
appropriations-to preclude such intervention in Angola.101 
Particularly in the late 1970s, the procedurally-minded observer could 
see that Congress enacted appropriations riders partly because members of 
Congress' minority party could thereby raise issues despite opposition by the 
majority party's agenda-controlling leadership.l02 For example, Senator Jesse 
Helms (R-N.C.), and kindred conservative House Republicans could raise 
foreign policy issues by appropriation riders in the late 1970s, notwithstanding 
the opposition of the Democratic President (Carter) and Democratic Senate, 
House, and committee leaderships.'O) 
President Reagan's controversial military initiatives-his overt aid for 
EI Salvador against its insurgency, and his covert aid for the Contra rebels 
against Nicaragua -naturally elicited resort to Congress' power of the purse. 
This Article will discuss below the specifics of the Contra-related Boland 
Amendments. Again, the resort to riders also reflected procedural 
considerations. When the divided Congress was unable to enact other forms of 
legislation about subjects like the Contras, appropriation riders could get 
through. The riders succeeded partly because the President affirmatively 
needed the House's votes for appropriations for aid, such as aid to EI Salvador 
and "humanitarian" aid to the Contras. Another reason for the riders' success 
was that necessary appropriations for other purposes, such as continuing 
resolutions, had to go through, even when they contained a rider disliked by 
the White House. '04 
100 See generally ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (4th ed. 1974) 
(analyzing the growth in powers of the presidency, particularly as to war and foreign affairs, 
and its acceleration during the Cold War). 
101 Clark Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 404,90 Stat. 729, 757-58 (1976), amended 
by International Security and Development Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-533, tit. I, § 
118(a)-(d), 94 Stat. 3141 (1980). For a detailed account of the provision's passage, particularly 
its roots in the Ford Administration's diminished credibility about such interventions, see 
Franck & Weisband, infra note 130, at 51-55. 
102 Congressional committees will not report free-standing bills on this subject to the floor, 
and even hypothesizing a proposed provision could reach a conference committee, there it 
would die. In contrast to the House, in the Senate proponents of a proposition advancing 
criteria for troop withdrawal may offer it as a non-germane amendment on a bill that the House 
has, or will, adopt, so that the Senate proposition makes it to conference. However, the floor 
leadership in both chambers may choose the conference delegations so that the proposition gets 
watered down or dropped before a conference report comes back to the two chambers. 
10) See, e.g., CHARLES WHALEN, THE HOUSE AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE IRONY OF 
CONGRESSIONAL REFORM 92-95 (1981). 
104 In 1981-86, the majority party in the Senate was the President's party. Thus the 
President and his Senate leadership, could block most avenues for legislating, such as 
independent ("free-standing") bills to put Boland-like restrictions into permanent law. But, the 
President and the Senate leadership could not block appropriation riders, at least not completely. 
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Although there were no momentous war appropriation conditions 
during the term of President George H. W. Bush, there was an important 
development of significance in how Presidents could respond to 
appropriations. President Bush continued and expanded President Reagan's 
formalized use of a hitherto insignificant gesture, the "signing statement." 
President Bush used signing statements extensively for expressing 
disagreement with, among other types of provisions, defense spending terms, 
which he said "might be construed to impinge on the President's authority as 
Commander in Chief and as the head of the executive branch.,,105 His signing 
statements announced that he would treat these provisions as diluted in some 
way-for example, as merely expressing a congressional aspiration-when 
Congress had actually worded the provision in strong mandatory language. 
The use of a signing statement as a potential response to an Iraq war term will 
be discussed later. 
During the Clinton presidency, congressional struggle with the 
President over obedience to appropriation controls was in relative remission. 
In response to the ill-fated course of the American intervention in Somalia, 
Congress put in place the ByrdlO6 and Kempthomel07 Amendments, which 
required American troops to leave that country by a 1994 deadline and not to 
return unless Congress specifically granted approval. The new Republican 
congressional majority after 1994 conducted disputes with President Clinton 
by proposals such as appropriation conditions forbidding American forces 
from taking part in multilateral peacekeeping under United Nations command. 
Although the Clinton Justice Department issued a lengthy opinion of much 
interest purporting to reject such a condition as unconstitutional,108 in reality 
President Clinton went to great lengths to demonstrate clearly that he would 
put American troops deployed to Bosnia under an American general and a 
NATO structure, not under the objected-to U.N. command. 109 
As for the very real presidential military actions,"° President Clinton 
committed troops to Bosnia in 1995 and led NATO's bombing campaign 
against Milosevic' s Serbia in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. In both instances 
Congress, after significant debate, neither expressly authorized nor expressly 
disapproved, by legislation or by appropriation conditions, these military 
105 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1766-67 (Nov. 5, 1990). 
106 See Ford, supra note 66, at 686-88. 
107 Rosen, supra note 81, at II n.53. 
108 Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical 
Control, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 182 (1996). 
109 The word "NATO" appeared ten times in President Clinton's address about the 
commitment (not counting the additional multiple mentions of European allies), while "United 
Nations" appeared only once. The only mention of the U.N. was that "American troops will 
take their orders from the American general who commands NATO .... [U]nlike the U.N. 
forces, they will have the authority to respond immediately .... " President William J. Clinton, 
If We're Not There, NATO Will Not Be ... Peace Will Collapse, WASH. POST., Nov. 28, 1995, 
at A8 (text of President's address). President Clinton twice noted the command structure for 
American forces: that they were under the command of an American general and would take 
their orders from the American general. Id. 
110 As to Haiti, see Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
Internat'l Law, 89 AM. 1. INT'L L. 96, 101-02 (1995); Mark T. Uyeda, Note, Presidential 
Prerogative Under the Constitution to Deploy u.s. Military Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict, 
44 DUKE L. 1. 777, 824-27 (1995). 
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actions and commitments in the former Yugoslavia. III In a tense and delicate 
way, in the 1990s neither the President nor Congress gave up ground; rather, 
there was something of an armed truce in the war powers dispute. 
President George W. Bush, in his first term, sought and received two 
express congressional authorizations for the use of force. One came three days 
after the 9/11 terrorist attack. Notwithstanding the expansive claims made for 
that September 14 resolution,112 its drafting clearly reflects a compromise over 
his loose initial proposal with the leadership of the then majority Democratic 
Senate. ll3 The more cautiously drafted compromise version adopted by 
Congress no longer authorized hostilities with countries having no share in 
9111; that is, it specifically avoided authorizing hostilities with the particular 
country known to be out of favor with some of the President's advisers-
Iraq. I 14 The other authorization concerned Iraq,IIS and came on the eve of the 
2002 midterm election. It conditioned force against Iraq upon fresh steps in 
the international arena,116 and President Bush used it to invade Iraq the 
following spring without a fresh resolution, or majority support for one, from 
the Security Council. 117 Of course, President Bush took many steps to mobilize 
his war powers. 118 Still, in war powers terms, those two express congressional 
resolutions of 2001 and 2002 meant that President Bush had, relative to other 
Presidents like Nixon, respected the separation of powers in terms of obtaining 
congressional authorization for war. 
III. RillERFOR WITHDRAWAL FROM A FULLY AUTHORIZED WAR? 
A. Basic Argument 
The most important appropriation rider type would direct a process or 
sequence of withdrawing American ground units from combat in Iraq. This 
would involve more than mere policymaking, but raises the ultimate question 
of ramping down war involvement itself. Just as the initial authorization for 
use of force makes the commitment of armed forces to war, a congressional 
direction for phased withdrawal implicates the reduction of military 
commitment. This is the case even assuming the rider allows such limited 
III For this period, see Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late i990s by Partial 
Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. I, 9-16 (1999); and Charles Tiefer, 
Adjustable Sovereignty: Contemporary CongreSSional-Executive Controversies About 
international Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 239, 255-57 (2000). 
112 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 2054-55 (discussing resolution passed by 
Congress on September 14,2001 and signed by President Bush on September 18, 2001). 
113 See generally Abramowitz, supra note 23 (outlining the legal and political issues raised 
in the passing of this resolution and the manner in which members of Congress reached a 
compromise on the resolution's text). 
114 For the loose original While House proposal printed in the Congressional Record by 
Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), see 147 CONGo REc. S9950-S9952 (daily ed. Oct. 1,2001). 
lIS See Ramsey, supra note 39, at 332-34. 
116 For analysis of the ignored language in the Iraq resolution, see JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE 
THAN WATERGATE (2004). 
117 The international sequence is treated in Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of 
Invading iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177 (2004). 
118 Nancy Kassop, The War Power and its Limits, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 509 (2003) 
(describing the sequence and basis on which President Bush invaded Iraq). 
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forms of continued commitment as some remaining ground commitment, 
American advisers, special forces units, air and naval forces, intelligence and 
logistics to continue to support Baghdad against any ongoing insurgency in 
Iraq. The change from a substantial American commitment, in terms of large 
numbers of American ground forces with large American casualties, to a 
reduced involvement with fewer American casualties, downshifts American 
involvement in the war. 
A rider that House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi drafted in June 
2005 for the FY 2006 defense appropriations fell into this category. The Pelosi 
Amendment would have required the President to set forth criteria for when it 
would be "appropriate to begin the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces 
from Iraq. ,,119 The criteria it sought included "assessing the capabilities and 
readiness of Iraqi security forces," and "the milestones and timetable for 
achieving,,120 the goals for such forces, an estimate of the total number of Iraqi 
personnel needed to perform the duties of current U.S. forces, the level of U.S. 
advisors needed to support Iraqi forces, and the political milestones for Iraq.121 
The Pelosi Amendment sponsors could not phrase the amendment 
within the narrow strictures for a "limitation" amendment. 122 A limitation 
amendment to an appropriation bill is in order-without needing any waiver of 
the House and Senate floor rules against adding legislative amendments to an 
appropriation-because it complies with a number of strictures, such as not 
involving any exercise of discretion by an executive official. It is all but 
impossible to write limitation riders that carry out delicate and complex 
policies while satisfying the requirements for a limitation amendment. Quite 
possibly, the best versions of each of the types of war and aid funding riders 
could not be written as limitation riders. 
However, even though war and aid funding riders may not meet the 
strict tests for limitation amendments, they may qualify to be made readily in 
order for offering on an appropriation bill. They may well apply to the specific 
funds (typically single-year funds) in the bill, and otherwise satisfy the 
requirements to be considered "germane." For example, consider an 
amendment to an appropriation bill funding the war stating that "none of the 
funds in this law may be used for military activity in Iraq unless the President 
is implementing a plan to reduce American ground forces in Iraq to a level 
below 80,000 by 18 months after this law's date of enactment." Such an 
amendment would not satisfy the full requirements for a limitation amendment 
because of the degree of discretion it gives the President, but would be 
considered germane to the bill. In the House such amendments procedurally 
require a waiver provision on the special rule to be in order for consideration. 
That special rule is a resolution reported by the House Rules Committee that 
119 Pelosi Amendment, sec. (a), 151 CONGo REc. H4S80 (daily ed. June 16, 2005). 
120 Id. sec. (b)(I). 
121 Id. sees. (b)(2)-(4). 
122 For example, the most famous rider in recent decades is the Hyde Amendment, which 
prohibits spending Medicaid funds on abortions. It could not be written to include an exception 
for the health and life of the mother because such an exception would preclude it from being a 
limitation amendment. Tiefer, supra note 9, at 986. Instead, it is typically adopted on the 
House floor with no such exception, but with a promise by its sponsors (which is kept) that such 
an exception will be added in conference. Id. at 987. 
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sets the procedure for consideration of the bill. An amendment that is 
technically legislation on an appropriation, and hence subject to a point of 
order, becomes in order by dint of the provision in the special rule waiving the 
point of order. 
That was true of the Pelosi Amendment. 123 When the majority 
leadership of the House refused to provide such a waiver, supporters of the 
Pelosi Amendment attempted the procedural steps to obtain the waiver and to 
make the amendment in order. 124 They were narrowly defeated in a vote; some 
majority members joined with the minority party, almost succeeding in putting 
together the requisite strength to move the amendment. 125 The existence of this 
channel for putting a war funding rider before the House constitutes a major 
respect in which the democratic process encompasses decisionmaking in the 
course of an ongoing war. If the public wants to know how it can assert its 
democratic prerogatives during an unpopular war, the answer includes pressing 
representatives in Congress to make a war funding rider in order and, then, to 
approve it. 
A brief debate occurred regarding the Pelosi Amendment, but the 
discussion was too truncated for significant airing of either policy or 
constitutional questions. Still, the offering of the amendment echoed the early 
stages of the proposed amendments during the Vietnam War.126 It 
demonstrated the existence of a large body of members willing to stake out the 
position favoring, albeit without a definite deadline, a phased process of 
withdrawal of the troops. There is every reason to expect that future shifts in 
public opinion about the Iraq war would bring sufficient bipartisan strength to 
make a rider in order and to pass it. Down the road, if the gap increased 
between public disenchantment with the war and presidential unwillingness to 
conduct a process of withdrawal, a stronger amendment could mandate, and 
succeed as the means for enacting, a drawdown schedule with definite 
deadlines. 
Besides the policy issues a withdrawal rider might trigger, either in 
Congress, in the press, or elsewhere, such a rider also raises debated 
constitutional issues. Supporters of congressional authority would cite the 
English and colonial origins, the expressed Framers' intent, and the long 
history of Congress' plenary power of the purse with regard to military 
spending. In functional and structural terms, they could point out that the 
public in an American-style democracy must have a way to limit their funding 
of a war with unacceptable costs and losses. For those who say that a 
congressional power to impose such terms would deny support to the troops, 
the answer has always been that full funding support for the troops would 
123 lSI CONGo REC. H4569, H4570 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Democratic 
Leader Pelosi). 
124 Id. This requires defeating the motion for the previous question on the version of the 
special rule reported by the Rules Committee. If the previous question is defeated, supporters 
of the Pelosi Amendment could amend the special rule to add a waiver of the rule against 
legislation on an appropriation, and then adopt the rule as amended. The Pelosi Amendment 
would then be in order. 
125 Id. 
126 Long before the successful amendments were enacted, the McGovern-Hatfield 
Amendment was proposed and defeated. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 29 (1993). 
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continue until their withdrawal. Troops do not want to fight a war where their 
nation no longer feels they should be sacrificed. The best way to support 
troops may be to withdraw them from combat when they have done what they 
can. 
The precedents of greatest relevance consist of the scope limits and 
cutoff provisions during the latter part of the Vietnam War. By 1971, 
Congress had repealed the original congressional authorization for the war, the 
1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution 127 and began to pass provisions recommending 
withdrawal of American troops. Nevertheless, President Nixon widened the 
war by using American forces in ground incursions and bombing of Cambodia 
and Laos. Notwithstanding the memorable early justification for this by then 
Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist/ 28 such expansion of the war 
triggered strong congressional reactions. This included appropriation 
conditions in 1971-73, and later, an appropriation cutoff for combat support 
after August 15, 1973, with a series of famous proposed and enacted 
amendments known by the names of their sponsors: Cooper-Church, 
Mansfield, Fulbright, and Eagleton. 129 When President Nixon avoided the 
cutoffs by transferring appropriation funds, he aroused the proponents of floor 
amendments. During the enactment of subsequent appropriation bills, these 
proponents essentially defeated the efforts of the Armed Services Committee 
and House floor leadership to forestall them and succeeded in imposing strict 
and comprehensive appropriation cutoffs. These ultimately precluded 
President Ford from recommitting American forces to prop up South Vietnam 
against its final collapse. 130 
These various Vietnam War provisions evoked much war powers 
debate, at the time and subsequently. President Nixon gave different rationales 
at different times for controversial combat action, particularly the bombing of 
Cambodia, which might have been undertaken for offensive strategic reasons 
of achieving victories in that country, or for defensive reasons of forestalling 
attacks from sanctuaries there on American forces in South Vietnam. As a 
result, part of the debate over the legislated prohibitions, such as limits on 
operations outside Vietnam, concerned the diverse impacts of those limits on 
variously-rationalized combat operations.13I It remained particularly open to 
debate whether Congress would cut off the use of defense appropriations for 
such bombing when the President expressed their purpose as being to protect 
our withdrawing ground troops.132 More importantly, though, the course of 
action demonstrated that Congress could condition appropriations to preclude 
the continuation of American large-scale combat intervention. However, this 
demonstration of congressional power regarded the Vietnam War, where there 
127 See Van Alstyne, supra note 48, at 20-21. 
128 
William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues-Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 628 (1970) (printing then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist's justification of 
President Nixon's military operations in neutral Cambodia and Laos, on grounds such as the 
President's legal authority to protect the troops even from the enemy units in neutral countries). 
129 See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 12, at 105. 
130 THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 13-33 
(1979). 
131 ELY, supra note 126, at 34-46. 
132 See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1, at 156. 
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were doubts about whether the broad conflict, as it had evolved, had ever really 
been fully authorized. Accordingly, the Vietnam War precedents raise the 
question of whether riders could limit a fully authorized and funded war, the 
question next addressed. 
B. Riders Limiting a Fully Authorized and Funded War 
l. Applying the Vietnam War Precedents 
On the frequently arising question of the President's authority to 
commit armed forces to hostilities without specific congressional 
authorization, presidential supporters have had many occasions to express their 
views. III In contrast, the record is less developed on the issue of presidential 
power to continue a war in the face of limiting provisions on appropriations 
once hostilities are long underway, apart from the debate over the Vietnam 
War provisions. The Vietnam War riders are the single overridingly strong 
example of congressional funding limitations on an ongoing war. Those riders 
plainly validated that Congress could impose limiting terms to bring American 
involvement in a war to an end, regardless of whether the President agreed. 
Still, reliance by proponents of Iraq war riders solely upon the 
Vietnam War as precedent would likely evoke a strong reaction from 
presidential power enthusiasts. Such enthusiasts know that they must address 
the comparison between the Iraq War and the Vietnam War and will probably 
continue to feel comfortable making their stand in terms of politically 
persuasive distinctions between the wars. They describe the Iraq War as a 
commitment on behalf of a democracy to replace the toppled regime of 
Saddam Hussein, against an insurgency having the tactics and loud backing of 
the terrorists of 9/1l. This contrasts with the Vietnam War, in which there was 
relatively little emphasis on South Vietnam becoming a democracy, and in 
which the insurgency, albeit Communist, was not linked to terrorists who had 
inflicted thousands of casualties within the United States. If there is support 
for the United States in the Iraqi population, and there is no clear alternative 
for Iraq short of anarchy, victory seems obtainable in the Iraq War; the 
Vietnam War had no such obtainable end (especially in hindsight). 
Many items go into the mix of comparing a 1960s anti-Communist war 
with 50,000 American deaths with the present war against a Middle Eastern 
insurgency with a few thousand American deaths. Some observers would 
focus on the similarities, others would focus on the differences. As to the 
constitutional issue, it is important that analysis of the validity of the Iraq 
riders not be reduced to whether Iraq is "like" Vietnam. The Vietnam War did 
not establish some kind of narrow legal exception that gives Congress its 
constitutional power of the purse only in a conflict with high enough casualties 
and low enough probability of victory. Rather, the Vietnam War riders 
illustrate that Congress has the constitutional power of the purse to reduce the 
scope of a war commitment. The interesting argument concerns whether there 
III See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 17 (responding to Professor Michael Ramsey's pro-Congress 
view of the war powers debate, based on a textual and structural theory ofa flexible approach to 
war powers); Sidak, supra note 14 (arguing that the Appropriations Clause has at times been 
improperly invoked by Congress in order to limit the funds available to the President). 
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was some legal reason that appropriation riders in the Iraq War would not be a 
valid use of that power. 
The best legal ground for presidential supporters to make a case 
distinguishing Iraq war funding riders from Vietnam riders rests upon a legal 
difference between the wars, namely, the full authorization the President 
obtained to initiate the commitment to the Iraq war, or alternatively, something 
unique about the post-9111 world. 134 The President in the fully authorized and 
funded Iraq war arguably has more legal authority than did President Nixon in 
the legally unauthorized wars in Cambodia and Laos in the 1970s, which 
followed an initial Vietnam commitment pursuant to the flawed Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution. For that matter, President Truman committed American troops to 
the Korean War without asking for express congressional ratification and then 
seized domestic steel mills to promote the war effort without congressional 
authorization. Thus, he had less legal backing in war powers law than 
President Bush has for the Iraq conflict. 135 Congress had not voted expressly 
for either President Truman's Korean War actions or for President Nixon's 
military operations in Cambodia and Laos. In contrast, Congress voted 
expressly on the 2002 authorization of force in Iraq. Even if Congress 
subsequently decides to put riders on its Iraq funding bills, it had provided full 
funding of the war prior to those riders and was continuing to provide funding 
while passing those riders. 
The argument that appropriation riders have less power to scale back a 
declared or otherwise explicitly authorized war like Iraq improves when 
employed as part of two strategies discussed below: (1) emphasis on the 
congressionally authorized mission in Iraq; and (2) interpreting riders in order 
to brush aside and minimize them. To support these strategies, the President 
needs to advance significant legal and constitutional arguments, rather than 
relying on the practical differences between Iraq and Vietnam. The President 
relies on the congressional authorization concerning Iraq, formally granted in 
2002 and not repealed or amended, as part of his source of authority. This 
authorization provides a constitutional distinction from the Vietnam War. The 
President also argues that the post-9fll world is legally different with respect 
to the President's powers. \36 
Critics of the Iraq war may question the clarity of the 2002 
authorization as applied years later, recalling the difference between the 
anticipated short-term hostilities with Saddam Hussein's regime and the 
134 For example, to justity warrantless eavesdropping of communications with the United States, 
the Justice Department devoted section II of its memorandum to the congressional enactment of the 
September 14,2001 full authorization of war against Al Qaeda and its allies. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsa\egalauthorities.pdf.at10. 
\35 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,676-80 (1952). 
\36 Proponents of strong presidential powers took an opportunity soon after 9/11 to argue 
that the President's powers to deal with the situation were broad. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT 
MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAlNST TERRORISTS AND THE NATIONS SUPPORTING THEM, 
http://www.usdoj.gov!o!c/warpowers925.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006). 
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unanticipated, drawn-out counter-insurgency that has ensued.137 This line of 
criticism, disputing the initial basis for war authorization, mayor may not 
matter politically, but it is separate from the questionl38 of the current legal 
validity of the authorization. 139 
2. The Unconstitutional Conditions Argument 
Far more important than questioning the initial authorization of the 
Iraq war in 2002 is, taking that authorization and subsequent full funding as a 
given, analyzing how that affects terms placed as riders in the funding to ramp 
down the war. The strong challenge by presidential power proponents to 
withdrawal terms is that they invalidly attempt to make the Commander in 
Chief do something contrary to his constitutional authority in a fully funded, 
fully authorized war. Presidential proponents argue that Congress is trying to 
take back a power constitutionally vested in the President by virtue of the 
initial authorization and the continued funding. Such withdrawal terms, they 
argue, are unconstitutional conditions .140 
Executive supporters on the Iran-Contra committee used the 
"unconstitutional conditions" argument about the Boland Amendments 141 and 
cited case law to extend the doctrine to the executive branch. 142 The Clinton 
Administration relied on the "unconstitutional conditions" phrase when it 
opined that the President could reject a condition on national security funding 
and yet still spend the funds,143 an approach that would be summarized, in the 
blunt language of politics, as "say no, but keep the dough. ,,144 In a relatively 
recent signing statement, President Bush used a similar rationale regarding a 
provIsion apparently responding to an earlier Iraq-related use of 
137 Other challenges include: (\) The justifications expressed by the Administration about 
the asserted existence of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction; and (2) the 
Administration's decision to proceed, despite non-fulfillment of the 2002 congressional 
authorization's pre-condition of another attempt to gain international support via the Security 
Council. The case as to conditions in the 2002 authorization is made in JOHN W. DEAN, 
WORSE THAN WATERGATE (2004). 
138 See generally Ely, supra note 32 (rigorously distinguishing between the war within 
Vietnam itself, which received authorization, however improperly obtained, in the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution, and the wars in Cambodia and Laos, which lacked such formal authorization). 
139 The Vietnam War is nearly unmatched in its degree of subterfuge and veiling of the 
extent and duration of ground troop commitment. It was effectively commenced when 
President Lyndon Johnson obtained congressional authorization via the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. 
Even the methods by which President Tyler initiated the Mexican-American War of 1846-48, 
or the questionable basis of the start of the Spanish-American War of \898, show that the 
standard of the past has been low in this regard. 
140 See supra note 28, at 145--46. 
141 H.R. REp. NO. 100--433 100th CONG., S. REp. No. 100-216 100th CONG., at 476-77 
(1987). 
142 They invoked case law in the domestic context that has indicated that an appropriation 
condition precluding the Department of Justice from performing constitutional functions, such 
as with respect to busing remedies in school integration cases, would be an unconstitutional 
condition. Id. at 479 n.23 (citing Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
143 The Sufficiency of the President's Certification Under the Mexican Debt Disclosure 
Act, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 673 (\996); Powell, supra note 27, at 551-54 & n.122. 
144 "Say no, but keep the dough" is a blunt way of saying that the essence of an official's 
consent to an appropriation condition consists of his eagerness, even knowing the condition, to 
spend the funding. See Engdahl, supra note 68, at 67-70. 
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appropriations. 145 President Bush's signing statement asserted that the notice 
requirement of a funding bill concerning new military installations abroadl46 
might violate "his constitutional grants of executive power as Commander in 
Chief.,,147 President Bush kept the funds, yet treated the term as in effect 
unconstitutional. 
Similarly, faced with a Vietnam-like cut-off or troop-withdrawal 
amendment, the President or his supporters could presumably argue that the 
clear Iraq war authorization, as well as the continued funding, allow and 
indeed require him to make his own decisions about whether to disengage his 
forces and remove them from the theater of war. In other words, these other 
authoritative congressional actions about Iraq put the Commander in Chief in a 
position not subject to Vietnam-like conditions riding along on the 
appropriations. Presidential supporters urge that our armed forces have been in 
Iraq since 2003, as Congress authorized, to establish a secure, viable 
democracy in the place of the former regime of Saddam Hussein. 
Furthermore, the enemy has special characteristics of the post-9f11 world and 
therefore the President must choose the core parts of the congressional 
authorization and appropriation laws-the parts that authorize and fund the 
effort--over the less essential part that contains the withdrawal term. 
3. The Significance of Congressional Decisions on Limited War 
Much of the real tactical use of the "unconstitutional conditions" 
argument involves its role after enactment when the President can use it to 
justify brushing off or minimizing the conditions without seeming to be in 
outright defiance. This part of the analysis will be discussed below concerning 
presidential undermining of legislation during implementation after enactment. 
At this point, the question concerns Congress' power to place limits on 
how far or long the Commander in Chief may go in conducting a fully 
authorized war. There does not appear to be any executive statement about 
whether the Congress has power to enact new limits by way of riders during 
wartime that supporters of presidential power could cite. 148 One particular 
argument for the Commander in Chief does indicate his possible position, even 
though it concerns presidential power in the absence of a particular operative 
appropriation rider. During the Vietnam War, when President Nixon's armed 
incursions into Cambodia required legal justification, then-Assistant Attorney 
145 President Bush improperly moved funds around, violating the required notice to 
congressional appropriators, for building installations as part of Iraq war preparations in 2002. 
BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 137 (2004). 
146 The FY 2005 military construction appropriation included codification of a stricter 
notice requirement for new military installations abroad. 147 
Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency 
Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. DOc. 2385-86 
(2004). 148 
See generally Powell, supra note 27 (citing previous executive opinions about 
unconstitutional conditions on appropriations, although none concern the paramount question of 
limiting the campaigns in a war). Powell's article cites, as the leading opinion about how the 
commander-in-chief power trumps appropriation conditions, Power to Detail Officers of the 
. Engineer Corps., 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 270 (1910) (regarding detailing officers to act as experts for 
an Interior Department advisory board, notwithstanding a general condition in the 
appropriations against details to bodies not expressly authorized by law). 
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General William Rehnquist, among others, made the case. President Nixon 
"has an obligation as Commander-in-Chief to take what steps he deems 
necessary to assure the safety of American Armed Forces in the field.,,149 The 
rationale for Cambodia operations was that enemy sanctuaries across the 
Cambodian border posed an increasing threat to the safety of U.S. forces as 
well as to the program underway in South Vietnam. 15o A president could argue 
that the kind of commander-in-chief obligations that gave President Nixon 
authority in Cambodia and Laos could today override an Iraq appropriation 
rider. 
Similarly, the President could say that an Iraq rider leading to a 
specified withdrawal schedule would undermine the military effort that 
Congress authorized and funded. A schedule for withdrawal might give 
insurgents a greater chance of victory over the Iraqi government and put our 
own troops-who Congress fully authorized and funded to be there-in greater 
danger. Presidential power proponents could say that such a rider infringes the 
Commander in Chief's responsibility and prerogatives. 
As a political matter, an appropriation provision of any rigor would 
only get enacted once the public feels sure that American forces are safer being 
withdrawn, even though the President claims that the withdrawal itself exposes 
them to peril. 
The constitutional issue turns on legal considerations of authority. Its 
answer comes from the constitutional concept of Congress' power to decide 
whether only a limited war will be authorized. The Framers understood well 
"the differences between 'perfect' and 'imperfect' war, or between 'general' 
and 'limited' war.,,151 In granting Congress the constitutional power "to declare 
war," the Framers handed Congress the instrument by which to choose which 
level of war to declare. By "level of war," I mean the characteristics that 
define the war's scope in broad terms of time, space, and nature: its duration, 
such as a termination or withdrawal process; its geographic scope, such as the 
decision of whether neighboring neutral countries are off-limits; and the nature 
of the war in other respects, such as whether it consists of just naval (or, today, 
naval-air) forces or also involves ground combat forces. 
The first American war with another nation after the end of the 
Revolutionary War is of great illumination regarding the Framers' intent. The 
undeclared naval war or "Quasi-War" with France of 1798 occurred barely a 
decade after the Constitutional Convention. That conflict received 
congressional authorization as a limited war. Congress limited it to a naval 
war and defined the areas in which captures of enemy vessels were permitted 152 
The Marshall Court passed upon several famous cases involving ships captured 
as prizes during that war. 153 It thereby set forth an eloquent jurisprudence from 
149 Rehnquist, supra note 128, at 638. 
ISO See generally BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note I (discussing enemy sanctuaries 
established across the Cambodian border). 
lSI Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 2059. 
152 See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 12, at 60-63. 
153 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 169 (1804) (holding that a captain of a vessel 
follows instructions from the President at his peril and that if those instructions are not strictly 
warranted by law he will be legally liable for the consequences); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1,7, 
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the Framers' era regarding limited war in general and Congress' ability to 
define a war's characteristics as to geographic scope and nature. 
This was no obscure encounter with some petty or backward opponent. 
France in 1798 was one of the world's great powers; it had been our most 
important ally in the Revolutionary War, and the issue of war with France in 
the years after its own revolution aroused the most intense partisan feelings. 
Moreover, the congressional limitations on the naval war were part of a 
broader pattern. Congress had created an army prior to the war but felt 
alarmed at its expense. It debated at length the approach to scaling back the 
army-a debate in which John Marshall himself played a key part. Marshall 
argued the issue with every indication that he in particular, and Congress in 
general, could judge the advisability of a military buildup or stand-down 
without trespassing on presidential prerogatives. 154 
The Framers' concretely expressed concepts of a limited war with a 
major opponent unmistakably contemplated that the President would carry out 
his role as wartime Commander in Chief within overall limits defined by the 
directions of Congress. When Congress authorizes a limited conflict-
meaning a conflict within limits of space, time, and goals-the Framers did not 
contemplate that the President could challenge Congress as improperly 
interfering with his commander-in-chief prerogatives. Nothing could be 
further from the treatment of the quasi-war with France. Congress set the 
limits; the President had to obey. The President could not argue that the 
commencement of war gave him the power to cast off limits set by Congress 
and to have the nation in a conflict of a greater scope than Congress 
authorized. 
Rather, the President proceeds within the limits set for the war as any 
commander would. He is the highest commander, the one who commands the 
entirety of the military, and this supremacy of his command cannot be 
unconstitutionally interfered with; but he is still commander of a war waged at 
a level defined by the nation through Congress. The action of setting limits for 
the war is deemed not to supplant or interfere with how any commander, 
including the Commander in Chief, directs his forces within the set parameters 
of the limited war. 
During our memory, as in the Framers' time, Congress has authorized 
limited wars. In 1983, it authorized the President's use of the armed forces in 
Lebanon to perform certain functions, primarily peacekeeping, with an 
eighteen-month limitation, an important precedent as the first such act of 
Congress authorizing the use of force since the end of the Vietnam War. 155 In 
1993, Congress authorized the President's use of the armed forces in Somalia 
for the very limited purpose of the protection of U.S. personnel and bases, with 
an approximately five-month limitation. 156 Again, this was an important 
precedent, continuing the pattern of congressional authorization for the Persian 
15,31 (1801) (discussing Congress' legislating and how it controls the law of salvage); Bas v. 
Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800) (discussing Congress' powers to make and limit wars). 
154 ALBERT BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 476-80 (1919). 
ISS Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-1119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983). 
156 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8151, 107 
Stat. 1418, 1475-77 (1993); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 
No.103-160, § 1512,107 Stat. 1547 (1994). 
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Gulf War in 1991. Via these actions, Congress revived its authorizing function 
after the doubts, confrontations, and defiance surrounding the Vietnam War 
and the War Powers Resolution. As even Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 
presidential power supporters, conclude from this and from a broader historic 
review: "This survey of authorizations to use force shows that Congress has 
authorized the President to use force in many different situations, with varying 
resources, an array of goals, and a number of different restrictions."ls7 
4. Limiting Provisions in the Midst of Wars 
There is one remaining argument for presidential power supporters: 
Even recognizing that Congress may define limits at the outset of wars, as it 
did in 1 798, it cannot impose them as funding terms during the combat. 
Actually, Congress did redefine the limits of the 1798 war, expanding those 
limits as it proceeded, but, nevertheless, the argument remains important to 
examine. The argument could be that, in the Iraq context, in 2002 Congress 
could have set limits in authorizing the conflict--on its scope or duration-but 
instead Congress made a defmite and defining choice when it authorized the 
conflict without imposing limits. 
The argument would emphasize that Congress could but has not 
completely stopped funding of the war by a cutoff. ls8 Hence, as long as 
Congress continues to fund a war started without limits defmed at the outset, 
the President may use the means placed at his disposal by that funding as he 
sees fit to prosecute a war. In other words, when he deems himself forced to 
decide whether to follow the original 2002-03 mission or to let his command 
function be interfered with by later conditions on appropriations, he may 
choose to honor the original authorization rather than the mid-course or "real 
time"ls9 dictation of limits. 
However, this view clashes with the understanding from the Framers' 
time to the present of the constitutionally intended function of periodic 
legislative funding as the channel for public action, not just at the beginning of 
wars, but in their midst as well. It was no aberration when, during the Vietnam 
War, Congress reacted against the Cambodia and Laos incursions by 
exercising its power of the purse and adjusting the extent of ground war 
combat. 
From the English and colonial models, the Framers spoke of the power 
of the purse not as a matter of unsupervised unconditional flows of war 
funding, but as an ongoing means of parliamentary control. 160 The Framers' 
IS7 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 2077. 
IS8 See Louis Fisher, Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 739, 
756-58 (1994--95) (discussing the efficacy of statutory cutoffs). 
IS9 The phrase "real time" is from BANKS & RAVEN HANSEN, supra note 1, at 155 & 
n.165. 
160 In the limited naval war with France, an initial congressional authorization to fight 
armed vessels on the high seas was succeeded by a later authorization to intercept vessels 
sailing to French ports. Such a subsequent or "real time" change in the limits on war was taken 
as plainly valid. The new limits were binding on presidential orders, and since President Adams 
had issued an order authorizing broader action than permitted by the congressional statute, it 
was held to be unlawful. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. at 179. 
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desire for such ongoing control was epitomized by the constitutional provision 
that appropriations for the army could never be for longer than two years. The 
colonial-era wars of France and England in North America and the 
Revolutionary War had schooled the Framers in the problems of long wars and 
continuing legislative responsibility. 161 Neither text nor background suggests 
the Framers envisaged the congressional limit-defining role to only occur at the 
outset and never after hostilities commenced. The most important military 
occupation in our history, the post-Civil War occupation of the former 
Confederacy, was repeatedly adjusted and ultimately ended by the debate over 
military appropriation riders. 162 Even in the period since the Vietnam War, 
both the Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993) time limits came in legislation 
after the initial commitment, without Presidents Reagan or Clinton arguing the 
unconstitutionality of such post-commencement limits. In sum, Congress has 
full authority to set terms of withdrawal by war-funding riders, whether a war 
has debatable initial authorization, like the Vietnam War combat in Cambodia 
and Laos, or clear initial authorization, like Iraq. Congress can define the 
limits of a limited war and can do so by the terms in the funding appropriation. 
There also seems to be no special reason that the characteristics of the 
post-9fll world would reduce Congress' authority to place limits on the scope 
of combat in Iraq. These characteristics, such as the irregular nature of enemy 
forces and their ability to infiltrate and to strike domestically, may have 
significance for some of the legal questions involving the President's power. 
However, in terms of the distribution of the power to decide the scope of 
funding and of combat in Iraq, the Iraq war is being conducted under regular 
congressional authorization and funding. U.S. forces conduct combat in Iraq 
predominantly by use of the regularly authorized and funded military services, 
rather than by the less overtly authorized and funded special arrangements for 
covert operations by intelligence agencies. Neither the conduct of the war nor 
its costs are being kept secret from the U.S. and foreign publics. Congress can, 
and does, openly debate the continuing commitment of men and materiel to 
that conflict. Congress can, and does, openly decide the pros and cons of 
committing men and materiel to Iraq rather than deploying them elsewhere or 
preserving them. Presidents may try to persuade Congress to defer to them in 
any conflict, be it the 1983 landing in Lebanon, the Vietnam War, or the Iraq 
War, on the basis of the nature of the enemy, their possession of superior 
intelligence, the necessity of continuing to engage the enemy without regard to 
setbacks, and so forth. But if Congress votes otherwise, there is no principled 
basis on which the President can usurp Congress' power of the purse, and 
expend the nation's resources, in Iraq differently than in past wars, if the 
nation, through Congress, decides to limit the scope of what it will authorize 
and fund. 
161 As has been previously discussed, the Revolutionary War demonstrated that Congress 
should leave the direction of combat operations to the Commander in Chief, not that Congress 
should give up the decisions on funding and, with these, on the scope of the war. 
162 See Lalor, supra note 91, at lIlA 7. 
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IV. DEFENSE POLICY AND IRAQ GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS 
A. War Policy Terms, Such as a Limit on Reservists' Combat Exposure 
1. War Policy 
A different type of argument about war funding riders would arise if 
Congress were to establish policy regarding American forces that, while 
important, did not limit the war in the same way as a decision from the outset 
on limited war or, later, on withdrawal of forces. In other words, let us put 
aside the reasoning just relied upon for Congress using its power of the purse 
to define the limits of a war in time, space, and nature. Taking as a given that a 
war in Iraq will continue with some level of ground combat for a period of 
time, may Congress make policy concerning how some of the military during 
that war is used, or would that amount to meddling unconstitutionally with the 
President's command prerogatives?163 
The enactment of a particular rider shows that policy riders are, in fact, 
coming. In 2004 and 2005 the press reported abuses of detainees in Iraq, 
particularly at Abu Ghraib, as well as elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo Bay. On this subject, the majority party leadership in Congress 
confined hearings to a minimum and allowed no vehicles for floor votes on 
curative legislation. However, when the emergency supplemental 
appropriation that funds the Iraq war came to the House floor in spring 2005, 
the proponents of legislative action, led by Rep. Ed Markey CD-Mass.) offered 
an appropriation rider. 164 This swiftly achieved enactmene65 is found in section 
1031 of that appropriation. 166 As the press quoted the Administration's 
spokesman, '''[i]f the Congress wants to use the appropriation process to 
dictate government action, that's within their power, and the Department of 
Justice did not oppose it. ",167 A sweeping provision, the "McCain 
Amendment" rider about detainee treatment, further addressed the issue at the 
end of2005. 168 
A concrete example will help flesh out the considerations regarding a 
policy rider that significantly affects what the President can do with some of 
163 See Lieutenant Colonel Bennet N. Hollander, The President and Congress-
Operational Control of the Armed Forces, 27 MIL. L. REv. 49, 73 (1965) (arguing that 
operational control of the military is exclusively for the Commander in Chief). 
164 The Markey rider was adopted via the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 
for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, H.R. 1268, 109th Cong., 1st 
Sess., at lSI CONGo REC. HI518 (daily ed. March 16,2005). Rep. Markey had offered the 
amendment to several bills, and his best exposition of the amendment was when it was offered 
to the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, H.R. 
2862, lO9th Cong., 1st Sess., at 151 CONGo REc. H4580 (daily ed. June 16,2005). 
165 The appropriation received a vote of 420 to 2 on the House floor. Dana Priest, CIA's 
Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted; Prisoners Say Countries Break No-Torture 
Pledges, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,2005, at AI. 
166 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 1031, 119 Stat. 231,256. 
167 Lichtblau, supra note 5, at A16 (quoting Department of Justice spokesman Kevin 
Malden). 
168 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109--48, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2739, 
2744 (2005). 
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the troops under his command. For instance, Congress may worry about the 
expanded and extended combat exposure of military reservists in Iraq and the 
risk thereby posed to the viability of the reserve system. 169 It may view the 
high level of reservists' combat exposure and losses as threatening both to 
destroy the existing reserve system so that it no longer backs up the regular 
military and to reduce unsustainably the ability of the reserve system to recruit 
and train for future foreign and domestic duties. 170 A provision limiting the 
combat exposure of reservists in Iraq might be good policy to avoid gravely 
impairing the functioning of the reserve system. 171 On the other hand, skeptics 
might say if the President does not choose such a step on his own, because he, 
among other reasons, considers it likely to set back the war effort in Iraq, then 
it would be bad policy. 
Let us assume that the public comes to support this particular policy 
(or whatever policy becomes the basis of a rider) so strongly that Congress 
enacts it, even though the President does not support it. For balance, let us not 
assume that professional military opinion on the question strongly condemns 
either the Congress or the President on this issue. The military recognizes the 
danger that Congress sees in the overuse of the reserves, yet understands the 
President's dilemma in trying to carry on an unpopular operation without 
enlarging the size of the regular Army.172 
Congressional supporters of such a rider would argue that Congress 
may put terms in its funding, even as to the use of different forces in an 
authorized and funded war, to preserve national defense capacities and 
interests that transcend Iraq-in this example, to maintain the imperiled 
reserve system's viability. In a general way, they might draw strength from the 
2004 Supreme Court decisions about detainees in Rasul v. Bush,17J and Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld,174 in which the Court rejected extravagant claims about the extent 
169 See generally Lt. Cmdr. W. Kent Davis, Innovative Readiness Training Under 10 
u.s.c. § 2012: Understanding the Congressional Model for Civil-Military Projects, ARMy 
LAW, July 2001, at 21; Andy P. Fernandez, The Needfor the Expansion of Military Reservists' 
Rights in Furtherance of the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the USERRA and ADA, 14 
ST. THOMAS L. REv. 859 (2002); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OfFICE, FORCE STRUCTURE-ARMY 
IS INTEGRATING ACTING AND RESERVE COMBAT FORCES. BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN, 
GAO/NSIAD 00-162 (2000). 
170 Such concerns are common, and have influenced the military's own planning. "[T]he 
nation's community of formerly part-time soldiers [has] been badly strained by lengthy 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan." Bradley Graham & Josh White, Army to Use Fewer 
National Guard Troops in Iraq, WASH. POST, July 1,2005, at A17. 
171 See Daniel Glick, Changing of the Guard: Feeling Betrayed in Iraq. Part-Time u.s. 
Soldiers May Mutiny at the Polls, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1,2004, at 69. 
172 For an example of the debate in this context, the Administration advanced a budget proposal 
to reduce the authorized strength of the National Guard from 350,000 to 330,000. A strong political 
reaction, emphasizing the heavy and perhaps unsustainable burden of the National Guard's continuing 
deployment to Iraq, forced the Administration to drop the proposaL But critics, including Republican 
governors, continued to note that the Administration was not providing the resources to sustain that 
Iraq commitment. See Robert Pear, Bush Policies Are Weakening National Guard. Governors Say, 
NY TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, atAI0. 
I7J 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
174 542 US. 507 (2004). 
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to which the Commander in Chief could function beyond express support in 
the laws. 175 
But, this is not a provision about which the President has no counter-
arguments. Unlike President Truman seizing steel mills during the Korean 
War without congressional authority, this concerns the Commander in Chief in 
his function of commanding forces in the theater of war. Namely, executive 
supporters may dispute Congress' right, by such a rider, to make policy that 
would assuredly interfere with the Commander in Chief's decisions on what 
use to make of the forces under his command. 
2. Criteria for Valid Wartime Policy Terms for the Military 
Neither the Framers' intent nor subsequent elaboration has defined 
precisely the characteristics of valid provisions dealing with military affairs. 
Let us name three of the President's strongest concerns expressed in executive 
branch legal pronouncements seeking to raise the commander-in-chief 
authority to resist congressional provisions: intrusiveness as to the monopoly 
of command itself; generality of measures, so as not to wrest authority over the 
disposition of particular forces; and a threshold of funding impact, so that 
Congress does not use its appropriations power as leverage to control 
operational affairs.176 
First, broadly speaking, the President's strongest concerns lie with 
intrusiveness into his monopoly of command itself. Aspects of this monopoly 
include the choice of subordinate commanders, the arrangements for orders 
and discipline, the responsiveness of subordinates and units to such orders and 
discipline, and the manner in which subordinates make strategic and tactical 
recommendations and carry out the decisions on such matters.177 
In this central area of the monopoly of command itself, a chief issue in 
the 1990s, which brings out the complexity of analysis in this context, 
concerned whether Congress could bar President Clinton from putting 
American forces under foreign (particularly United Nations) command. 
Politically, the issue concerned the effort by the Republican Congress to depict 
cooperation by President Clinton with United Nations peacekeeping forces as 
an encroachment on American sovereignty. 178 
The Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department provided an 
uncompromising opinion that a provision in a House bill to rule out such a 
foreign command arrangement would infringe the commander-in-chief 
175 But see Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767-68 (1996) (accepting commander-
in-chief power in discipline context). 
176 No individual executive branch pronouncement sets forth a list of factors like this. Rather, 
there is a tendency to provide sweeping assertions of the scope of the commander-in-chiefpower. An 
examination of the contexts in which those assertions are made, as discussed below for each of these 
factors, suggests these are the key ones. 
177 Examples of cases and instances about these can be found in Hartzman, infra note 183, 
at 69. 
178 The issue is placed in context, along with others, in Tiefer, supra note 45, at 239. 
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clause. 179 That opinion quoted many of the available scraps of significant 
guidance about the commander-in-chief clause. The Supreme Court said in 
1850 that "[a]s commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the 
movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and 
to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual .... ,,180 In 1895, 
the Court said that the clause "vest[ s] in the president the supreme command 
over all the military forces-such supreme and undivided command as would 
be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war."181 
In the opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote, "the President may 
determine that the purposes of a particular U.N. operation in which U.S. 
Armed Forces participate would be best served if those forces were placed 
under the operational or tactical control of an agent of the U.N .... " As such, 
they determined that Congress may not, by appropriations condition or 
otherwise, "prevent the President from acting on such a military judgment 
concerning the choice of the commanders under whom the U.S. forces engaged 
in the mission are to serve. ,,182 
Yet, even on this core concern of command itself, the Bar Association 
of the City of New York extensively canvassed the law and history and came 
to a more neutral outcome. It concluded that such a provision would be most 
unwise, yet not unconstitutional, because of the concurrent nature of Congress' 
powers to make rules for the military.183 This conclusion is particularly striking 
because the provision in question dealt with the essence of the clause, namely, 
with command itself. In this sense, if we search for the qualities that 
distinguish some provisions from others, this provision has a high degree of 
"intrusiveness" inasmuch as it affects command directly and significantly. 
That there was room for debate owes to a second quality, not typically 
isolated, yet crucial in many of the commander-in-chief arguments: the extent 
of generality in the congressional constraint, in the sense of addressing the 
general overall structure and relations of the components of the armed forces 
without getting into any specific mission for any particular component. 184 For 
all the intrusiveness and dubious wisdom of the "no U.N. command" rider, the 
rider did not direct itself toward a particular operation or mission. It laid down 
a general rule regarding command structuring. In that regard, it complied with 
the constitutional provision that Congress shall make the rules for the military. 
For example, Congress has guided the United States military through several 
179 Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical 
Control, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 182 (1996). 
180 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603,9 How. 603, 615 (1850). 
181 United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281,284 (1895). 
182 Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 179, at 185-86. The opinion also brings in a 
discussion of the President's foreign policy powers and how this provision may interfere with 
them. 
183 Richard Hartzman, The Comm. on Mil. Affairs and Justice of the Ass'n of the Bar of 
the City of New York, Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral Context: A 
Constitutional Analysis of Congress's Power to Restrict the President's Authority to Place 
United States Armed Forces Under Foreign Commanders in United Nations Peace Operations, 
162 MIL. L. REv. 50, 105-07 (1999) (explaining why Congress' rulemaking power has primacy 
over the President's command power in a context where the powers are concurrent). 
184 Fisher, supra note 10, at 763 (pointing to appropriation restrictions that, without 
contest, prohibited where U.S. forces could operate). 
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successive waves of reforms since World War II to centralize and clarify its 
command structure. ISS No one has questioned the constitutionality of Congress 
undertaking such far-reaching command reorganization because the rules laid 
down in these laws make up in generality for their seeming trespasses on the 
command turf of the Commander in Chief. 
Some kinds of quite general riders could operate very intrusively. For 
example, many in Congress were critical at various times of Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, notably in connection with the Abu Ghraib scandal 
regarding detainee abuse. A rider phrased in nonspecific terms that transferred 
military authority over detainees in the war zone to another Cabinet-level post, 
such as the director of national intelligence, might superficially seem general 
in nature. Yet, in context, such a provision would seem distinctly intrusive to 
the Administration, aimed as it would be at congressional transfer of command 
responsibility from a more controversial to a less controversial figure. The 
President would be expected to prevail in branding such a provision as an 
invasion of his prerogatives as Commander in Chief. Thus, generality is a 
factor in the justification of appropriation provisions, but it takes more than 
mere superficial generality to make a valid rider. 
A third quality for appropriations terms concerns the extent to which 
Congress uses a spending impact under a de minimis threshold to invade an 
executive prerogative. Proponents of presidential power have used the example 
that Congress cannot use its plenary power over appropriations to condition the 
President's use of pens and paper upon what kind of pardons he signs with 
them. 186 A similar question about conditions upon de minimis spending arises 
when Congress uses its control over the appropriation of salaries for State 
Department or Central Intelligence Agency officials to condition their conduct 
of foreign and intelligence affairs. ls7 The same type of issue would arise if 
Congress became so disenchanted with particular high officials in the 
Department of Defense working on a large project as to prohibit the use of any 
military appropriations for communicating with them. In contrast, a provision 
prohibiting expenditures on that large project itself would certainly pass 
muster, insofar as it not only purported to condition the spending of money, but 
did, in fact, act upon the spending of significant appropriated funding. 
These criteria of intrusiveness, generality, and threshold spending 
impact can be applied to a potential provision about exposure of reservists to 
combat. The President's supporters might well argue that taking away his 
ability to order reserve units into the positions of full combat exposure intrudes 
somewhat on his command powers. However, it is one thing for Congress to 
say who can and cannot command certain kinds of units, but quite another for 
it simply to say that certain uses are inappropriate for certain kinds of units, 
whoever might command them. The provision at issue does not have as a 
185 Congress' strictures in this regard culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986), undoubtedly 
the boldest command reorganizing of the era. A good discussion is Peter M. Murphy & 
William M. Koenig, Whither Goldwater-Nichols?, 43 NAVALL. REv. 183 (1996). 
186 See, e.g., Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty: 
Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 
1225, 1250 (2003). 
187 Nobleman, supra note 93, at 154-57. 
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direct aim or mode of operation the displacing of presidential command. That 
is, the command of the reserves is not taken away from the President and given 
to someone else, nor are the reserves released from presidential discipline. 
Rather, while certain uses of the reserves are ended, for all the authorized uses, 
the President remains the Commander in Chief. 
The real intrusiveness question concerns whether the provision 
interferes with the conduct of campaigns and decisions on strategic and tactical 
disposition of forces. 18s A proponent of presidential power might say that while 
Congress can simply terminate funding for some kinds of units (such as 
reservists), having funded them, it cannot speak to their uses. Yet by pulling 
reservists out of combat, Congress has stayed at a level of generality about the 
availability of certain forces, without usurping from the Commander in Chief 
the strategic and tactical decisions to be made in using such forces. 189 
A 1909 Attorney General opinion, mentioned in Part III, approved as 
constitutional a congressional provision that eight percent of detachments 
aboard naval vessels consist of marines. 190 A similar provision in the 1990s 
precluded the U.S. military from engaging in construction activities (absent 
explicit statutory authority)-a large hindrance after U.S. military intervention 
in Haiti. 191 Like the 1909 provisions, this one adopts a completely general rule 
about the use of a kind of unit, without getting into strategic or tactical 
decisions of the President and his subordinates. 192 In seeking to preserve the 
188 Presidential power proponents would cite the broad dicta in opinions such as Training 
of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 61 (1941) ("[T]he 
President's responsibility as Commander in Chief embraces the authority to command and 
direct the armed forces in their immediate movements and operations .... "). While there are a 
number of opinions with similar broad dicta, none seem to actually come to grips with questions 
of the boundary between commander-in-chief authority regarding the conduct of wars, and 
congressional authority to make general rules regarding substantial military resources. 
189 Professor William Van Alstyne made an apt distinction between the propriety of 
Congress prescribing the uses to be made of the military, and the impropriety of Congress 
dictating minutely the President's strategy and tactics: 
Congress .... also has a distinct enumerated power to provide for armies and navies, 
and to prescribe the uses to be made for them. There is nothing inconsistent between this 
proposition and another one, which arises from a combined reading of the declaration of 
war clause and the President's power as Commander-in-Chief. This is the proposition that 
under those circumstances in which Congress has affirmatively embraced a commitment to 
belligerent activities overseas on a sustained basis, it may not presume to dictate the minute 
strategy and tactics of the President's conduct of the authorized enterprise. 
Symposium, The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus Congress' War 
Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 17, 46 (1988). 
190 27 Op. Att'y. Gen. 259, 260 (1909). It is curious that the attorney general the 
following year gave President Taft an opinion with a different tone about the relative powers of 
President and Congress, as discussed in Part IILB.3. 
191 
Rosen, supra note 81, at 147. 
192 Another issue, the right of the press to certain kinds of arrangements for covering the 
war, has previously brought out this kind of analysis distinguishing the President's realm of 
strategy and tactics from more general wartime military matters. Rana Jazayerli, Note, War and 
the First Amendment: A Call for Legislation to Protect a Press' Right of Access to Military 
Operations, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131, 165 (1997); Keven P. Kenealey, Comment, The 
Persian Gulf War and the Press: Is There a Constitutional Right of Access to Military 
Operations?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 287 (1992). To have the reserves reinforce or not reinforce a 
particular front would get closer to presidential strategy prerogatives. But in this provision, they 
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reserve system, Congress deals with an invaluable resource upon which it 
allocates a large part of its military spending. When it uses appropriations 
limitations to make policy about that system, it is making a very substantial 
decision about raising and spending taxpayer funds as the vehicle for that 
policy. In contrast to the criticism when Congress imposes conditions on de 
minimis expenditures, such as imposing pardoning or diplomatic conditions on 
salaries or office supplies, Congress has every right to use substantial 
expenditures for this part of the military system as an occasion for making 
policy. 
This particular policy issue takes the constitutional analysis an extra 
step, because the issue of handling the reserves happens to be one that the 
Framers gave unusually extensive attention. 193 The Constitution makes 
considerable textual references to the "Militia," today the National Guard 
reservists of the individual states. In fact, the commander-in-chief clause 
itself94 says "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States. ,,195 Article I, section 8, clauses 15 
and 16, give Congress the power: 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of 
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be 
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the 
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the 
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress. 196 
These provisions suggest that Congress does have reason to make 
policy on such matters, even in wartime. Listing the congressional powers 
with respect to the militia in Article I, Section 8 is not meant to resolve the 
boundaries between the President and Congress, but only to clarify the 
additional powers of Congress vis-a-vis the states with respect to their state 
militias, a matter that might otherwise be ambiguous and difficult to resolve in 
are treated distinctly in the nature of a vital human resource removed from an unfit use that will 
destroy them, but otherwise not earmarked for or against any particular strategy in the war. 
193 The argument for the proponents of presidential power would be that the Framers 
might allow Congress to feel deeply and specially invested in nursing along a militia (or 
reserves) system through "organizing" and "arming" it, but if the President's decision to send 
the militia into types of combat that ought to belong to the regular army put in jeopardy that 
precious investment, the Framers gave no sign of considering that to be Congress' concern. 
194 There, the Framers carefully eliminated any distinction between the nature of 
presidential command over the regular army and navy, and the nature of presidential command 
over the militia once called up. So, presidential supporters might say that lowering the combat 
exposure of reservists did not differ from doing so for some portion of the army or navy, and, 
hence, interfered with the unity of command characteristic of the Commander in Chief. 
195 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c\. 1. 
196 Presidential power proponents would note that these precisely delineated powers of 
organizing and arming (Congress') and even training (states') come to an end at the boundary of 
combat operations. 
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a system of dual sovereignty.197 The Framers' attention to Congress' authority 
over, and investment in, the reservists shows their expectation that Congress 
would make rules for them, such as the provision under discussion, without 
constituting an affront to the role of the Commander in Chief. 
As the Committee of the New York City Bar said in discussing 
legislative provisions about potential United Nations command, Congress' 
powers to make regulations for the military often operate concurrently with the 
President's command powers. In this instance, Congress has a long-term 
policymaking role in keeping the reserve system viable, including recruitment, 
training, benefits during and after service, and the effect of high levels of 
combat casualties on all of these components. Congress has long acted 
together with the career military in increasing the dependence of the regular 
military on reserve units, to handle potential simultaneous involvements 
without having to maintain an outsized, unsupportable regular military. 
Congress has the responsibility to make policy with these goals in mind, 
considering not just this war and this administration's tenure, but future wars 
during future administrations. Therefore, this rider would be constitutional. 
Still, this analysis has treated only congressional involvement with the 
policy decisions of the U.S. government. Quite distinct legal considerations 
come into play when the Congress desires to affect the policy of another 
government, in this case the government ofIraq. We now tum to this topic. 
B. Terms on Aid as to Iraqi Governance198 
Different considerations arise with regard to military training and 
reconstruction and other aid to the Iraqi government. Congress has made 
decisions, including terms, regarding foreign aid, usually, but not invariably, 
without running into constitutional disputes. However, Congress could test its 
limits by using riders to make policy on issues deeply involved with 
presidential wartime relations with our Baghdad ally. To ground the analysis 
in the concrete, Congress could put terms on its military training and 
reconstruction aid requiring governance concessions by the government of Iraq 
to the disaffected Sunni minority. Presidential power proponents might dispute 
such terms as unconstitutionally intruding upon the President's foreign affairs 
prerogatives. 
1. Background of Foreign Aid 
The background concerning foreign aid starts with aid during ("Lend-
Lease") and after ("Marshall Plan") World War II, and during the Korean War, 
reflecting the close connection between war and aid to allies. 199 Congress 
enacted the original template of the modem worldwide assistance program in 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which gave the President a variety of 
197 See Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990) (holding that Congress has the 
right under Article I to order members of the National Guard to train outside the United States). 
198 Iraq's fmances can be followed at Iraq Revenue Watch, supra note 2. 
199 Meyer, supra note 46, at 71-72 & n.IS. 
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independent spending powers and waiver authorities. 200 An uproar resulted 
from Congress' discovery during the latter part of the Vietnam War that 
President Nixon had conducted a secret war in Cambodia, partly through the 
use of special powers over aid to the Sihanouk regime. 201 Amidst the initial 
suggestions by presidential power proponents that the President had a 
constitutional foreign affairs power over the use of foreign aid,202 Congress 
tightened up aid control in the 1970s, particularly as to human rights. 203 
In the 1980s, the relevant issues concerned aid to Central America. 
President Reagan viewed aid to the Central American countries as part of the 
effort to combat insurgencies characterized as a component of Nicaraguan 
destabilization. Congress reacted against human rights abuses in EI Salvador 
and Guatemala, such as extensive death squads and the covered-up rape and 
murder of six American nuns by an army unit, by country-specific conditions 
requiring sometimes detailed presidential certifications of progress.204 The 
executive-congressional struggle came down, on one side, to presidential 
willingness to make certifications concerning improvements in human rights 
that observers considered highly at odds with the truth. On the other side, 
Congress supplemented its certification requirements with mechanisms such as 
short-term aid disbursements coupled with timely presidential reporting and 
creation of independent commissions to monitor and report on events.205 
By the mid-1980s, the particular issue had become aid to the 
presidentially backed Contras fighting the Nicaraguan regime. Congress 
enacted a series of laws, the Boland Amendments, taking advantage (as 
discussed in Part rY06 of the available procedure of the appropriations rider to 
impose various kinds of prohibitions on American aid to the Contras. Then the 
Iran-Contra scandal burst. Congressional hearings revealed that the White 
House had secretly supervised worldwide solicitation efforts, nicknamed "tin 
cup diplomacy," to persuade regimes that it courted, many with zero intrinsic 
interest in Central America, to give aid to the Contras. During the tin cup 
diplomacy period,207 the Administration had not made any open constitutional 
argument against the Boland Amendments. After the scandal broke, 
presidential power proponents argued about the flawed nature of the 
amendments-their changing nature and their inapplicability to White House 
solicitations.20s Most relevantly, these proponents argued the 
200 Pub. L. No. 87-195,75 Stat. 424 (codified in scattered sections of22 U.S.C.). 
201 Meyer, supra note 46, at 76. 
202 See generally Don Wallace, Jr., The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers 
Over Foreign Aid: Part I, 1970 DUKE L.J. 293 (1970) (disputing that Congress can interfere in 
the diplomacy that occurs as part of the distribution of foreign aid). 
203 Meyer, supra note 46, at 76-82. 
204 Id. at 100. 
205 Id. at 82, 100. 
206 Franck & Weisband, supra note 130, at 13-33. 
207 For background on tin cup diplomacy, see generally Whiting, supra note 63. 
20S Connie Ferguson Bryan, Note, Limiting the Use of Funds Appropriated for Executive 
Functions: Is the 1984 Boland Amendment Constitutional?, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 569,602 
(1988). 
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unconstitutionality of the amendments' impact on the President's conduct of 
C' • f~· 209 lorelgn a larrs. 
The arguments continued, in a different form, into the administration 
of President George H. W. Bush. As Vice President, Bush had played a part in 
the solicitations of aid for the Contras. While Congress sought to enact 
provisions nailing down an express prohibition against solicitations, President 
Bush fought these by veto. 
As the argument evolved, President Bush fought to draw this line. He 
conceded that Congress could prohibit quid pro quo arrangements, in which 
the executive branch offered aid to third-party countries in return for their 
making contributions to the Contras or similar diplomatic causes. However, he 
opposed Congress' efforts to prohibit executive solicitations, in which third-
party countries were asked to contribute to such Administration causes without 
an express promise of aid to them as a quid pro quo. This specific issue of tin 
cup diplomacy will not recur in Iraq, but it does suggest where presidential 
power proponents might fight to draw the line. 
In their most wide-ranging form, the aid-related arguments during the 
Reagan and Bush administrations drew on the general presidential 
constitutional power over foreign affairs. Reciting this familiar argument at 
length is not necessary, for so little of it has to do with congressional 
appropriations. Even for appropriations, the precedents cited by presidential 
power proponents usually deal with the easier case for the executive when 
Congress puts foreign affairs conditions on its appropriations for the State 
Department or for officials' salaries. 2lO While this holds some intrinsic interest, 
it does not relate to the situation presented in Iraq, where Congress does not 
merely provide the facilitating appropriations for the functioning of American 
officials, but, more importantly, provides massive appropriations of 
reconstruction and other aid for that country. 
Controversies over the terms of aid that continued during the Clinton 
and Bush administrations further fill in this picture, often with very different 
political contexts from those of the 1980s Central America. On one occasion, it 
was the Democratic administration of President Clinton making highly dubious 
certifications, such as decisions about Mexico's drug enforcement.2Il On 
another major issue, Congress had long imposed an anti-abortion term on 
international family planning assistance. President Clinton sought to reverse 
his predecessor's policy and to relax the basis for providing such aid, but he 
could not overcome Congress' repeatedly imposed policy terms, however 
much they interfered with his foreign policy.212 
Conversely, President George W. Bush subsequently sought to reverse 
the Clinton policy, and to restore the earlier policy of the previous President 
Bush, in this regard, which was to tighten up the basis for providing such aid. 
209 Id. 
210 For background on these conditions, see Nobleman, supra note 93. 
211 Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in Us. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 240--42 (1999). 
212 Tobey E. Goldfarb, Comment, Abstinence Breeds Contempt: Why the Us. Policy on 
Foreign Assistance for Family Planning is Cause for Concern, 33 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 345, 351 
(2003). 
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This obliged him to deal with the "Kemp-Kasten" amendment, which would 
only bar aid to China upon specific findings of aid being used for a forbidden 
coercive abortion policy.213 Once again, as with the 1980s aid to Central 
America, a President dealt with aid requirements as he wished by making a 
determination that observers found incredible, which is important to recall in 
anticipating the implementation of any congressional aid riders.214 
2. Application to Iraqi Aid 
A major debate about terms on aid occurred in late 2003, relatively 
early in the Iraq counter-insurgency, but when doubts had already arisen about 
the President's course. 2lS President Bush sought from Congress a massive 
appropriation of $18.4 billion for Iraq reconstruction aid, expected to last for 
several years. A strong bipartisan congressional coalition would have made 
half of the package into a loan administered through the World Bank. The 
Senate voted 51 to 47 to impose the requirement, producing front-page 
headlines that "Senate Defies Bush on Iraq Assistance,,,216 and the Senate 
conference committee delegation included a majority who had voted for it.217 
That Senate action reflected a powerful public mood when faced with the scale 
of aid, which spanned the ideological spectrum. There never was any hint of a 
constitutional objection to the term. Rather, it was dropped in conference when 
two of the Senate conferees absented themselves and voted by proxy to reverse 
their earlier support, a surprising reversal that apparently resulted from 
personal lobbying by the President. 21S 
The scale of the 2003 aid appropriation meant that while President 
Bush would annually call for military training aid, he would not need to seek 
another appropriation for reconstruction aid for several years. Still, the 
President would call for additional aid for one purpose or another, and interim 
legislation might contain provisions about the aid. Another detail about the 
2003 aid appropriation's enactment showed why proponents of presidential 
power could be expected to object to some terms. When President Bush signed 
the 2003 aid act into law, his statement did, in fact, single out a provision for a 
constitutionally based objection, namely, the provision creating an inspector 
general. The passage in his signing statement with the objection read: 
213 Melissa Upreti, The Impact of the "Global Gag Rule" on Women's Reproductive 
Health Worldwide, 24 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 191, 197 (2003). 
214 Kaci Bishop, Comment, Politics Before Policy: The Bush Administration, International 
Family Planning, and Foreign Policy, 29 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 521,533-39 (2004). 
21S For an elaboration of the early doubts, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the Future of 
United States Foreign Policy: Failures of Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 149 
(2004). 
216 Jonathan Weisman, Senate Defies Bush on Iraq Assistance, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 
2003, at AI. 
217 Tiefer, supra note 4, at 211. 
21S !d. 
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Title III of the Act creates an Inspector General (IGY'9. 
Title III shall be construed in a manner consistent with the 
President's constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation's 
foreign affairs, to supervise the unitary executive branch, and 
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The [Coalition 
Provisional Authority] IG shall refrain from initiating, 
carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or from 
issuing a subpoena, which requires access to sensitive 
operation plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence 
matters, ongoing criminal investigations by other 
administrative units of the Department of Defense related to 
national security, or other matters the disclosure of which 
would constitute a serious threat to national security. no 
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By this statement, President Bush put limits on the oversight of the Iraq 
reconstruction aid by the inspector general office chartered by a congressional 
rider. 221 
This record about past foreign aid issues indicates that future proposed 
terms regarding reconstruction and other aid for Iraq might well produce a 
debate along the following lines. This example concerns terms to condition a 
large portion of aid upon governance concessions towards Iraq's disaffected 
Sunni minority. That Sunni minority, which held sway during Saddam 
Hussein's regime, forms the base of the insurgency. For purposes of analysis, 
assume that the American public, and hence a bipartisan majority in Congress, 
becomes convinced that the insurgency will not be sufficiently pacified to 
permit a withdrawal of American forces unless Baghdad is pressured to make 
substantial governance concessions to the Sunnis. Assume further that the 
President balks at threatening to cut off the aid funding to the regime in 
Baghdad, absent such concessions to the Sunnis, particularly if Congress 
purports to empower independent watchdogs to make sure the pressure is 
really applied. 222 This Article addresses the constitutional issue of whether 
Congress has the authority to place tough foreign aid conditions on war 
funding. 
219 The statement read "an Inspector General (IG) for the CPA." The CPA, or Coalition 
Provisional Authority, transferred sovereignty to the Government of Iraq, and administration of 
the aid then went to the State Department. A special inspector general's office for the aid was 
created in the State Department. 
220 Statement on Signing H.R. 3289, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, 39 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. 
Doc. 1549 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
221 Presidential issues about the independence of inspectors general are treated in Charles 
Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Executive Abuse, 63 B.U. L. 
REv. 59 (1983). 
222 Background on the reasons why a change in governance for the Sunnis might become 
an option of interest to the public and Congress for speeding our exit from Iraq can be found in 
Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq: Bush's Islamic Republic, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Aug. 11, 2005; Peter W. 
Galbraith, Iraq: The Bungled Transition, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 23, 2004, at 70; Peter W. 
Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, May 13,2004; Public International Law 
& Policy Group, Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in Iraq; Some Basic 
Considerations, 39 NEW ENG. L. REv. 53,67-70 (2004). 
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On the one hand, Congress would likely face no constitutional hurdle 
in proposing terms that earmark the aid funding so that a specific portion of it 
went to the disaffected Sunni minority. Nor would Congress likely face much 
difficulty in creating reporting requirements, such as asking the President for 
reports on the progress of the regime in Iraq toward changing the governance 
of the Sunni minority. However, earmarking and reporting do not go as far as 
the public and Congress may demand. The impact of earmarking funding for 
Sunni areas may be blunted due to lack of security during wartime and other 
circumstances that limit how much or how fast aid can be furnished in Sunni 
areas. Bland Administration reporting alone will not change the governance of 
the Sunnis. So, Congress may be inclined to vote for stronger medicine. 
On the other hand, presidential power proponents may well dispute the 
validity of provisions heavy-handedly intruding upon the President's 
constitutionally granted foreign affairs discretion regarding treatment of a 
wartime ally.223 If the requisite findings must be made, not by the executive 
branch, but by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), a legislative branch 
agency, such proponents would find aid conditions constitutionally 
unacceptable. It still would not be acceptable if the findings were made by an 
inspector general within the executive branch who has some statutory degree 
of independence from the President's direct control. It is a much closer 
question whether such provisions would be deemed constitutionally 
objectionable by presidential proponents if, on the one hand, Congress let the 
executive branch itself make the findings, but, on the other hand, Congress (as 
it did with some Central American aid in the 1980s) created an independent 
advisory commission to report on these matters.224 
The foregoing analysis suggests its own resolution. In non-war 
contexts, Congress has had a virtually free hand in imposing conditions on aid. 
Presidents have dealt with this as President Bush dealt with the Kemp-Kasten 
provision about family planning aid-by making determinations that observers 
find incredible. 225 
In contrast with non-war contexts, in wartime Congress arguably does 
not have quite so free a hand in imposing conditions on aid. But Congress also 
does not lack authority merely because of presidential positions of the past. In 
the 1970s, Congress regained control of aid to Southeast Asia after discovering 
President Nixon's uses of aid to Cambodia. 226 In the 1980s, Congress regained 
control of financing of insurgencies by means of conditional aid, the Boland 
Amendments, and the Iran-Contra investigation. 227 Earmarking alone will not 
reach the important aspects of Iraqi governance, which Congress may wish to 
223 That is, they may dispute provisions conditioning increments of aid upon fmdings 
about bringing Sunnis into the government, altering governmental arrangements to suit the 
Sunnis, giving them enhanced local autonomy, or other specific steps amounting to conditions 
about changed governance rather than just about earmarking aid. 
224 For a discussion of the analogous controversy over 1980s Central American aid 
conditions, see Amy S. Griffin, Constitutional Impediments to EnforCing Human Rights 
Legislation: The Case of El Salvador, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 163 (1983). 
225 That is, President Bush eschewed defeating the provision on the basis of some 
hypothetical constitutional basis, but handled it by policy arguments in the Congress and by 
post-enactment implementation in ways that achieved the outcome he desired. 
226 Franck & Weisband, supra note 130. 
227 Meyer, supra note 46, at 87. 
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cure or at least to address by means of aid terms. The inspector general and the 
GAO's exposures of large-scale contracting abuses in Iraq suggest the 
continued need to have such entities examine compliance with terms. Carried 
to its ultimate limit, the presidential power proponents' notion of a unitary 
executive would mean that the task of critically assessing what Baghdad does 
with our aid falls to the same officials tasked with making the Iraq situation 
look as favorable as possible. Accordingly, this rider would be constitutional. 
Some might imagine that the canvassing of these various types of Iraq 
appropriation riders brings to a close the analysis of what will happen upon 
their enactment. Before the 1980s that might have been true. However, in more 
recent years, Presidents have found a new and different context for dealing 
with provisions like appropriation riders, namely, the use of post-enactment 
tactics such as pronouncements undermining such provisions in presidential 
signing statements. It is this context to which the analysis now turns. 
v. AFTER ENACTMENT: PRESIDENTIAL UNDERMINING 
A. Presidential Undermining 
1. Why the President May Choose Not to Defy and Not to Comply 
This article has repeatedly attributed the debate about the 
constitutionality of war and aid funding terms to presidential power proponents 
rather than the President himself. For tactical reasons, the President may only 
imply his constitutional position during congressional consideration of 
provisions, rather than lock himself into an express and clear stance. Presidents 
may not want to make a commitment to veto any bill carrying the provision, 
particularly since its most likely vehicle would be a major defense spending 
bill. Presidents may care more about other aspects of such a defense spending 
bill, including its overall size, its allocations to key accounts, and the timing of 
its passage. Conditions about the conduct of wars may raise important 
problems without Presidents choosing to use their strongest weapons such as 
veto threats, because Presidents reserve their strongest weapons for fights over 
war appropriations' size, allocation, and timing. 
Such presidential prioritizing of issues may be, but need not be, a 
betrayal of constitutional ideals or otherwise deeply objectionable. The most 
honored wartime Presidents have sometimes put the most important issues of 
national commitment legislation first, and handled their objections to lesser 
issues such as constraints included as riders later. To take a particularly 
respected example mentioned earlier, in 1940 President Roosevelt obtained 
passage of the bill authorizing the first peacetime draft only by including a 
condition against using draftees outside the Western Hemisphere, and even 
then only with the margin of one single vote in the House. 228 Had President 
Roosevelt made a constitutional issue about that condition, he would have lost 
the bill, leading to a very great setback for American preparedness for World 
War II. President Roosevelt's subsequent military occupation ofIceland, which 
is outside the Western Hemisphere, is cited by presidential power proponents 
228 
See supra text accompanying note 98. 
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to support their argument that a President may sign a bill and later deal with its 
asserted infringements of his constitutional powers. 
In a different but related vein, is a decision made by President George 
H. W. Bush at a critical moment in the January 1991 congressional 
consideration of a resolution to authorize the Gulf War. The President's more 
anti-congressional advisers, notably Secretary of Defense Cheney, urged him 
at that critical juncture to rely upon his own unilateral constitutional war-
making power. Instead, the President asked Congress not merely for its support 
for him to exercise unilateral presidential power, but also for its authorization 
based on Congress' own powers, as expressed clearly in the presidentially 
endorsed language of the Gulf War Resolution. This deference to Congress' 
legislative responsibility both established a major precedent confirming 
presidential responsibility to respect Congress' powers and enabled President 
Bush to win the Senate vote with bipartisan support and to lead successfully a 
united nation in a broadly supported war. Like Roosevelt in the 1940s, Bush in 
1991 proved himself a superior wartime President because he did not insist on 
the Presidency's supremacy regarding all decisions about war. 
So, the President may not lock himself in by a veto threat, nor actually 
veto the bill carrying the Iraq rider. These two polar alternatives less 
interesting analytically than a third, which deserves the closest study. 
First, the President may starkly and avowedly defy the rider. A few 
times in history, Presidents have famously done so. As previously mentioned, 
when Congress halved the appropriation President Theodore Roosevelt had 
requested for a Navy fleet to sail around the world, he is said to have 
responded that he would have the fleet sail halfway around the world and leave 
it up to Congress if they wanted to bring it back. 229 But, defiance has its 
disadvantages. Any Iraq provision which has enough strength to get through 
both houses of Congress against the resistance of the President and of his 
party, which controls the agenda in both houses, presumably has public 
opinion clearly behind it. Defying such a provision would be defying the 
public. 
Moreover, a voting majority in Congress, with clear public support 
behind it, has ways of retaliating. In 1973, President Nixon defied a Vietnam 
War funding cutoff and continued bombing by using funding legerdemain to 
get around the provision. Congress responded by placing similar provisions on 
each of a host of bills it considered.230 Whatever the congressional response, if 
the President outright defies an Iraq funding provision, Congress' ability to 
place similar provisions on other bills means his defiance will lock him into 
repeatedly fighting an issue on which, politically, he has previously lost. 
Second, the President may comply with the rider, even as far as to 
mollify congressional critics. For all the steps President Franklin Roosevelt 
took in 1940-41 regarding World War II, he did not intervene in the war, 
which would have brought a colossal clash with Congress. Instead, he brought 
Congress along with him by seeking legislation on preparedness and Lend-
229 
See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. 
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Lease.231 He kept enough good faith with Congress that it tolerated his form of 
naval conflict with Germany in the North Atlantic and his oil embargo against 
Japan in the Pacific. 
Compliance now with an Iraq rider would have similar benefits in 
keeping a restive Congress on board with aspects of the Iraq effort that are not 
resolved by the rider itself Moreover, compliance avoids the consequences of 
secret defiance, once it is no longer secret. Both President Nixon with his 
secret bombing war in Laos, and President Reagan with his secret support of 
the Contra war, elicited a storm of adverse reaction when their secrets came 
out. 
The President, however, has powerful bases not to concede the full 
measure of what congressional critics seek in an Iraq rider, as long as he can 
avoid the pitfalls of either secret or stark defiance. Being Commander in Chief 
and chief of national diplomacy has constitutional significance both in the 
theoretical and, just as importantly, in the practical sense. That is, the President 
has more than merely his theoretical arguments for respecting his role as 
Commander in Chief and diplomatic leader. In addition, the President has 
enormous scope, by use of his practical powers in these roles, to shape what 
follows from an Iraq rider. This can be accomplished by interpretation and by 
the choice of the implementation approach. Currently, the President has at his 
disposal tremendous institutional machinery, since he not only controls all of 
the executive branch, but also has the support of the majority party in 
Congress. President Reagan did not have this, particularly in 1987-88 when 
both houses were Democratic; even President Roosevelt in a sense did not 
have this in 1941, when a conservative coalition had control of much of the 
committee machinery in Congress. The President need not concede an Iraq 
rider's full import so long as he can find a way to mobilize his strength. 
2. The Signing Statement 
Post-enactment, the President may display several unexpected legal 
tools for handling war and aid funding terms to which he objects. 
Congressional provision sponsors must anticipate not merely a reiteration of 
the pre-enactment arguments, but the use of those arguments by the machinery 
now to be discussed, as a basis for limited compliance with the appropriation 
terms. 
The pivotal post-enactment step has become the presidential signing 
statement.212 Before the 1980s, what Presidents said or wrote while signing a 
bill had no more formal significance than any other presidential speech or 
issuance. President Reagan began to issue such signing statements 
231 By urging preparedness as a means of national defense, he brought Congress along with him 
on a draft army and on spending for military installations and equipment. Similarly, by urging the 
providing of Lend-Lease arms resupplies to Great Britain and, after mid-1941, to the Soviet Union, he 
brought Congress along with bolstering the countries that were currently resisting Nazi aggression and 
that would be the United States' future allies once war began. His approaches reduced the resistance 
from the substantial portion of the public and Congress that wanted to bolster the country's position 
against future war while not wanting to get involved in the war prematurely at all. 
232 Kristy L. Carroll, Whose Statute is it Anyway?: Why and How Courts Should Use 
Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 
477 (1997). 
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systematically, as a new mechanism for proclaiming positions and, if possible, 
establishing them as having some authority.2J3 His successor, President 
George H. W. Bush, wished to reassert presidential authority after the Iran-
Contra scandal had reduced his position's authority, particularly vis-it-vis a 
refractory Congress taking active lawmaking and oversight steps against 
executive abuses. Just as Congress saw the passage of defense spending bills as 
an occasion to implement riders dealing with such abuses, the President saw 
passage of such bills as occasions for signing statements that would proclaim 
his constitutional ability to trump those riders. 234 President Clinton made a 
partly muted resort to such riders,235 and President George W. Bush picked up 
where his father had left off. President W. Bush issued more than one hundred 
signing statements by 2006, greatly expanding upon the scope and character of 
such statements issued by prior Presidents. 236 
A type of signing statement that might also be called a "brushing-off 
statement" proclaims a presidential constitutional prerogative as the basis for a 
path combining the surface appearance of respect for the legislation with the 
reality of little or no change in direction. Such a brushing-off statement notes a 
provision in the bill that assertedly transgressed the commander-in-chief or 
foreign affairs powers, and summarizes the general nature of the presidential 
objection.237 Then, the statement announces that the President will interpret the 
provision in light of his constitutional powers. It may stop there. Or, 
alternatively, it may take a provision intended as a broad or definite prohibition 
and announce that in light of the constitutional objection, the President will 
treat it as narrow or merely advisory.238 
Part of what a signing statement accomplishes for the President is to 
seize the initiative. Enactment of bills with offending provisions may constitute 
defeats for Presidents in the legislative forum. Evidently, their arguments, legal 
and otherwise, did not win sufficient adherents or, because the President did 
not care enough about the issue, may well have received little expenditure of 
political capital. By the time of signing, the point has long passed when the 
President could have the provision excised or changed. The President then lets 
his legal counsel, who is the statement's author, take the image of his authority 
in dealing with the provision, without the President ever having to expend any 
233 Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential 
"Signing Statements," 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 209, 212 (1988). 
234 Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign President, supra note 33, at 44. 
235 See Walter Dellinger, Memorandum for Bernard N Nussbaum, Counsel to the 
President, 48 ARK. L. REv. 333 (1995) (approving signing statements as a vehicle for 
presidential prouncements, but disapproving them as a means for making legislative history). 
236 Elisabeth Bumiller, For President, Final Sayan a Bill Sometimes Comes After the 
Signing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,2006, at 11. 
237 Carroll, supra note 232, at 493 n.l02 (citing statement by President Reagan that found 
a provision prohibiting aid to the Contras to conflict with the President's foreign affairs 
powers). 
238 See, e.g., Statement on Signing H.R. 2673, The Department of Defense Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic 
Influenza Act of Dec. 30, 2005, Pub. 1. No. 109-148,2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. ("Many provisions of 
the CAA are inconsistent with the constitutional authority of the President to conduct foreign 
affairs, command the Armed Forces .... The executive branch shall construe as advisory the 
provisions of the CAA that purport to: (I) direct or burden the Executive's conduct of foreign 
relations .... "). 
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actual political capital with arguments, promises, or threats to legislators or 
other significant political figures. 
Moreover, by interpreting away the offending aspects of the provision, 
the President's lawyers get to pronounce a narrowed version of it without 
having to persuade anyone to agree. This permits a President to declare 
something more vague and less hard-edged than outright defiance (a highly 
controversial approach),239 yet avoids the accusation that the ensuing narrow 
treatment of the provision is furtive or covert. Meanwhile, executive civilian or 
military officials who might naturally obey the manifestly broad and 
mandatory intent of the law now have a seemingly authoritative direction from 
on high to veer off with a very different notion that all but suspends the law. 
The overwhelming majorIty of brushing-off statements went 
completely without public or congressional attention. Often, they concerned 
minor provisions or obscure issues. Or, they did not garner much attention 
because the stated objections did not signal any serious confrontation with 
Congress. Observers may have no serious concern about the signing statement, 
knowing that something like it occurred on a similar bill the year before. 240 
Presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush only occasionally used 
signing statements to stake out positions on national security of real 
significance. An important example was President Bush's signing statement 
accompanying the McCain Amendment on detainee treatment. 24\ 
However, faced with an Iraq war rider, a President may find great 
value in a brushing-off statement as the start of pursuing a course largely 
unaffected by supposedly mandatory congressional directions in a rider. In 
signaling his approach via a signing statement, the President would not 
reawaken echoes of Iran-Contra or of President Nixon's secret bombing of 
Laos, for he would not be creating distance between his stance and the relevant 
legal authority through self-discrediting subterfuge or mendacity. Instead, he 
would publicly and overtly shrug off the rider's mandatory force by resorting 
to a facially proper executive power and would use official and open channels 
to proclaim that his own will trumps that of any officials (e.g., the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff) who might otherwise believe their duty consists in following the 
legislation. 
It deserves note that this presidential evasion of statutory war restraints 
may be, but need not always be, a betrayal of constitutional ideals or otherwise 
deeply objectionable. The most honored wartime Presidents have sometimes 
significantly stretched such restraints. To take a particularly celebrated 
239 For a discussion of the issue of presidential outright refusal to comply with an 
appropriation restriction, see Peter Raven-Hansen & William Banks, From Vietnam to Desert 
Shield: The Commander in Chief's Spending Power, 81 IOWA L. REv. 79,117-26 (1995). 
240 For example, intelligence authorization laws carry a classified annex which contains 
the specific subtotals for particular spending subjects, since those numbers are classified. 
Presidents developed a habit of putting in their signing statements that the classified annex 
lacked the force of law, since they took the position that a Congress that did not carry out the 
full and open procedures of enactment for the classified annex had not, in fact, enacted it. The 
objection lacked any practical weight because neither Presidents nor their supporters wanted the 
subtotals voted upon openly like other legislation. 
24\ Statement on Signing H.R. 2863, The Department of Defense Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic 
Influenza Act of Dec. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,2005 u.S.C.C.A.N. 550. 
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example, in 1940 President Roosevelt traded fifty World War I destroyers with 
Britain in return for long-term base leases.242 At a time when the Navy was 
desperately struggling to resolve its shortfall in ships to meet the sudden 
preparedness emergency, a statute precluded him from turning over those 
destroyers unless they were declared surplus. It strained statutory language to 
declare the fifty destroyers surplus and thus available for transfer to Britain. 
President Roosevelt's persuasion of Congress eventually proved to be an 
esteemed balancing act rather than a disservice to the law.243 In a different 
vein, President Clinton arranged the commitment of peacekeeping troops to 
Bosnia in 1996 by convincing Congress that they would be there for just a 
single year.244 A decade later, American troops remain there. In context, the 
whole operation is generally seen as a success, even considering the stretch 
involved in calling it a one-year commitment. Presidential strain on statutory 
war restraints can be vindicated partly by the President's overall honesty and 
deference to Congress, and partly by the practical success of his policies 
abroad. 
3. Interpretive Tactics 
After starting with a brushing-off statement, the President may then 
seek concrete interpretation-guided courses of action. These approaches yield 
little to Congress in the making of war and aid policy. They may be called 
"minimizing interpretations," although they can reduce the legislation to the 
extent that the enacted law is a bare shadow of its intent. 
Concrete examples from each of the categories previously discussed 
help here. Suppose the President faces a supplemental appropriation bill of war 
and aid funding for Iraq with three riders attached by a bipartisan majority of 
Congress over the resistance of presidential supporters. One rider states that 
none of the funds shall be spent on the war unless the Defense Department 
develops and implements a plan for withdrawal of regular ground combat 
forces from Iraq as speedily as described conditions permit in a maximum of 
two years. A second rider states that none of the funds shall be available for 
funding units of reservists in Iraq unless they are assigned or reassigned so as 
to minimize their combat exposure within six months. The third rider states 
that a quarter of the military training or reconstruction aid in the bill shall not 
be available unless the Secretary of State certifies that the government of Iraq 
has made substantial progress in satisfying the objections of the legitimate 
Sunni leadership to the existing government in Baghdad. 
In a signing statement, the President would set forth his objections, 
given his commander-in-chief and foreign affairs powers, to these provisions 
242 Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive 
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 741 (1998). 
243 This is partly because history judges presidential actions, perhaps unfairly, from what 
evenruates. Once the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 forced the United 
States into war, divisions in the public and Congress between interventionists and isolationists 
were forgotten, and FDR's pushing the envelope on what he could do in anticipation of war 
was, in retrospect, honored on all sides. 
244 David G. Delaney, American War in the 1990s, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 261, 264 
(2002) (reviewing DAVID HALBERST AM, WAR IN A TIME OF PEACE: BUSH, CLINTON, AND THE 
GENERALS (2001». 
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and warn of their impact on troop safety. The statement would impose 
interpretations upon them consistent with the aforementioned objections and 
declare the imperative of treating them as non-mandatory. Gradually thereafter, 
the President would make known those minimizing interpretations. 
As for the troop withdrawal rider, the President's withdrawal schedule 
would go no further for the next year and a half than it had before. He might 
then state a hope that conditions would allow withdrawal of the combat units in 
the last quarter of the two-year period, although if conditions did not permit 
this, he would not be obliged to implement the withdrawal. By the end of the 
rider's withdrawal schedule, the President would still have a high number of 
troops committed, and would be implementing his own policies with minimal 
regard for the rider. 
In response to the rider regarding reservists, the President would 
announce that reserve units should not be used as assault spearheads on 
insurgent strongholds except under unique circumstances. Additionally, 
commanders should contemplate reducing the use of reservists in operations 
expected to have high casualties, subject to all other tactical considerations. 
The President would also indicate that implementation of the new legislation 
should produce virtually no change in their existing pattern of deployments, in 
which reservists suffer casualties in their hazardous duties (apart from assault 
spearheads or high-casualty operations). 
The President would respond to the Sunni conditional aid rider by 
instructing the Secretary of State to certify the Sunni role in governance based 
on Baghdad's reply to a formal inquiry. In other words, the Secretary of State 
would take Baghdad's word on the subject upon which the rider specifically 
intended her not to rely. The Secretary's certification decision would discount 
the seemingly significant communications by Sunni leaders themselves, 
regardless of whether these occurred directly, through indirect channels, or 
through the media. 
Working through these concrete examples brings out how the 
resolution of war powers issues consists, at this stage, of much more than an 
analysis of texts and contexts. Once Congress has actually moved proposals all 
the way through to enactment, and the resolution of the issues involves the 
interaction of the executive and legislative branches, the war powers debate 
concerns the dynamic institutional and political interactive processes. This has 
been the theme of some of the best contemporary analyses of war powers 
• 245 issues. 
What happens after brush-off statements and minimizing 
interpretations depends on the extent to which the institutional operations of 
the House and Senate either serve to shield the executive branch against 
criticism, pressure, and political consequences, or, alternatively, serve to 
reinforce such attacks. These issues are reflected in the different constellations 
of presidential-congressional interaction at three different stages of the 
Vietnam War. At the first stage, in 1964, President Johnson faced an 
institutionally supportive Congress. Not only did his own party hold majorities 
in the Senate and House with party-leader support, but the committee leaders 
245 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 66, at 613 (discussing how war powers issues exist in "an 
ongoing process of decisionmaking"). 
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supported him as well. His gross deceptions and deviousness in securing the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which afforded him wide open authorization to 
escalate the war, occurred without any institutional challenge. 
By 1966, President Johnson still had floor majorities and party leader 
support, but he had lost the protection of the key committee leader, Chairman 
William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fulbright held 
tough, televised oversight hearings about the Johnson Administration's empty 
assurances of victory. This did not bring the war to an end, but it did lead in 
two directions: toward an increase in congressional capacity to secure 
compliance with its legislative directions about the Vietnam War, and toward 
the elaboration of overarching principles that led to the dramatic 1970s 
legislation reasserting Congress' role in many aspects of national security and 
foreign relations. Still, the President had many cards to play, such as invoking 
the Food and Foraging Act,246 which allowed the Defense Department to incur 
obligations without appropriations under some247 circumstances. 248 
By 1974, President Nixon not only faced floor majorities of the other 
party, he faced an institutional apparatus, from committees to member 
organizations, capable of sustained legislative and oversight effort. After initial 
war funding cutoff provisions,249 he attempted a version of the minimizing 
interpretation.250 The institutional apparatus Congress had assembled against 
the war directed oversight, criticism, and additional provisions upon the 
executive position and overcame it. 
The Vietnam War comparisons suggest why the current President will 
be drawn to respond to Iraq war riders with dismissive statements and 
minimizing interpretations. His party has a majority in both houses of 
Congress. Moreover, the centralizing forces operating in that party since 1995 
make it unlikely that strong majority leaders of full committees will emerge in 
opposition in the way Chairman Fulbright did in 1966. Rather, since the 
committee leaders support the President and oppose the position of those 
pushing Iraq war riders on the floor, the committee leaders will use their 
position to shield the executive branch against criticism, pressure, and political 
consequences. They will arrange hearings in which the Administration has the 
best opportunity to make its case. They will not use subpoena powers or 
similar tools to uncover information that the Administration does not want to 
make public, such as problems with the war or procurement scandals. Passage 
of war spending bills would continue to be structured so as to involve the least 
246 41 U.S.C. § 11 (1996). 
247 An early opinion by the Attorney General took a narrow view. Support of the Army, 15 
Op. Atty. Gen. 209 (1877). 
248 For a broader view of the uses of the act, see Authority for the Continuance of 
Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 43 Op. Atty. Gen. 293 
(1981). 
249 "President Nixon signed a 1971 military authorization bill, but objected to a provision 
in it (the Mansfield Amendment, which set a fmal date for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from 
Indochina) as being 'without binding force or effect.'" Dellinger, supra note 235, at 345 
(quoting Richard Nixon, PUB. PAPERS 1114 (1972». 
250 His Defense Department continued the bombing war by transferring appropriations 
from one account to another, and relied upon the position that the transferred appropriations 
were not covered by the cutoff provisions. This was even given a fancy, albeit bogus, doctrinal 
label by the State Department's legal adviser-the notion that these cutoffs could not serve as 
"conditions subsequent." 
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exposure to renewals of unwelcome floor amendments. Presidential 
interpretation of the riders would receive formal and informal approbation, 
obscuring their legal implausibility. 
This institutional congressional assistance provides a wartime 
President the ability to fend off powerful pressures to change policy. However, 
acting on this ability may be deeply objectionable or even be a betrayal of 
constitutional ideals. To take another noted example, in 1950 during the 
Korean War, when President Truman cashiered popular General Douglas 
MacArthur, the General initially appeared capable of pressuring the 
Administration into a more bellicose stance. 251 The congressional committee 
leaders of the same party as the President channeled MacArthur into closed 
hearings, leading to the recognition of how his strategy could potentially lead 
to World War III. The MacArthur bandwagon was effectively defused. Thus, 
institutions of Congress can serve wondrously varied purposes. 
B. Counters to Presidential Undermining 
It may seem completely beyond the reasonable scope of discussion to 
begin detailing possible counters now, so far in advance of any actual 
presidential efforts to undermine appropriation riders; but advance discussion 
is sensible for multiple reasons. First, although some of the steps or arguments 
previously discussed may not be familiar to the public, they are familiar to 
knowledgeable figures in the executive and legislative branches. The 
government runs on appropriations: their annual consideration takes up a fair 
fraction of the attention Congress gives to enacted laws, and both supporters 
and critics of Iraq policy, who deal with congressional affairs, understand the 
significance of the appropriations process for funding war and aid to affect 
policy. 
Second, anticipation of the various steps impacts the earliest actions, 
such as the initial drafting and debate on proposed riders. Proposal drafters 
must strike a balance between language that will gain the broadest public 
support and win over key members of the majority party and language that will 
be least susceptible to being brushed off and minimized. Proposal opponents 
will criticize both the basic thrust of the provisions and the aspects that either 
help accomplish passage or deal with undermining them. For example, during 
the mid-1980s, the Boland Amendments governing aid to the Nicaraguan 
Contras went through a number of versions, often reflecting the new 
Administration's political positions, such as the push to allow "humanitarian 
aid.,,252 Yet once the Iran-Contra scandal broke, defenders of the 
Administration cited the changing nature of the Boland Amendments as 
making them too complex and shifting to obey, even though the changes were 
largely made at Administration request. Notwithstanding the highly 
251 General MacArthur appeared capable of directing strong national discontent with the 
Truman Administration into a strategy of escalation toward war with China, including the use of 
nuclear weapons. This alarmed even hawkish senators. 
252 
Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings o/the Commander 
in Chief, 80 VA. L. REv. 833, 861-65 (1994). 
340 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42:291 
sophisticated White House-centered group running the Iran-Contra operation, 
this proved a useful defense. 
There are various methods by which proponents of Iraq war riders can 
counter presidential undermining: by including standards, loophole-closing 
requirements, and watchdogs in the provision. First, to the extent congressional 
provisions have concrete standards, Presidents have less room to minimize 
their effect. A withdrawal provision that includes dates for some levels of 
withdrawal, such as completion in no more than two years, will withstand 
presidential minimizing better than a provision with no such dates. A policy 
provision with specifics about reducing reservist combat exposure, such as 
excluding reservists from the kinds of operations that exceed a specific level of 
casualties in the previous year, will withstand presidential minimizing better 
than a provision with no such specifics. This is particularly true of terms on aid 
that require changes in Iraqi governance. A provision with specifics about 
increasing the Sunni role in governance, such as reserving shares in certain 
posts for Sunnis, will withstand presidential minimizing better than a provision 
with no such specifics. So, provision drafters anticipating post-enactment 
presidential minimizing will include specifics about what they wish, and 
endure the inevitable criticisms that such detailed provisions constitute 
"micromanaging," out of awareness that by doing so they have a greater 
chance of affecting policy. 
Second, provisions can include language imposing informational 
requirements and closing loopholes, including those apparent either before the 
process starts or after successive rounds of appropriation riders. For example, 
the incessant criticism by presidential power proponents that these provisions 
endanger the troopS253 will pressure some of the proposal-drafters either to 
include the safety of the troops as a factor or to let the President waive the 
provisions in the interest of national security when that has little effect on the 
criticism. No one in Congress does, or could, fail to support the safety of the 
troops. However, expressing that as a factor or, worse, as a basis for complete 
waiver of the provision, opens the door for recapitulating how President Nixon 
temporarily evaded constraints on expanding the Vietnam War. President 
Nixon used arguments about the need to protect the troops from enemy 
sanctuaries in Cambodia in order to sustain operations that were not actually 
intended to promote troop safety, but in reality advanced the same policies of 
conducting a wider war that the public and Congress had rejected. In the same 
way, a President could rationalize operations in Iraq as intended to deal with 
dangerous enemy sanctuaries when they, similarly, were primarily designed to 
sustain a wider war that the public and Congress rejected. It may take a round 
of presidential loophole-use before provisions are enacted to close them. 
Similarly, provisions can include informational requirements. 254 The 
key to implementation of congressionally-mandated policies consists of 
obligating the President to inform Congress about the actual performance of 
those policies. This matters most when, as now, the majority party is that of the 
253 Recall how the Nixon Administration used this argument. Rehnquist, supra note 128, 
at 638. 
254 As to those informing powers in this context, see GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIPLOMACY, supra note 1, at 295-313. 
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President, because the chairs of the committees of jurisdiction are unlikely to 
employ their ordinary nonstatutory powers to watch over the performance of 
riders that they opposed. 
Those with a practical view of the art of enacting provisions may scoff 
at the notion of excess specifics and loophole-closing. They will point to the 
daunting problems of enactment. The President and the majority floor and 
committee leadership in both chambers will oppose such provisions, making 
every step in their progress a siege. There is no gainsaying this problem. 255 It 
suffices to recognize the difficult but necessary balance between shepherding 
to passage a provision with inevitable compromises, and trying to keep it 
robust enough to actually change policy. 
Third, the provisions may include watchdogs. In the early 1980s, 
President Reagan effectively nullified aid restrictions for countries like EI 
Salvador and Guatemala that required certifications of human rights 
improvements, by certifying to whatever the law required without regard to the 
facts running counter to this certification. The partial solution in later rounds of 
legislating consisted of having a watchdog body-in the Central American 
case, a commission that provided independent fact-finding about human rights. 
In terms of military withdrawal and policy conditions, creating express roles 
for GAO scrutiny would help.256 Despite the criticism this draws from 
presidential proponents, if the Administration certifies to implausible positions, 
but the law gives the GAO a scrutinizing role that brings out truth, the press 
coverage and congressional and public reaction will differ markedly from what 
occurs without such a GAO role. 
A concrete example from an Iraq aid rider highlights this point. When 
President Bush persuaded Congress in 2003 to vote $18.2 billion in aid for 
Iraq, some riders, albeit not the most important ones, went through. Notably, 
the law created a special inspector general for the Coalition Provisional 
Authority. By a clever interpretation, the Administration managed to end this 
after a year.257 Still, before that point it conducted a good deal of inspecting 
and issued a number of critical reports that received press attention. So, putting 
provisions for watchdogs in riders matters. Although they make it harder for 
Congress to establish limits in Iraq that function effectively, the President's 
powers to brush off or interpret away war and aid riders can be overcome by a 
combination of good drafting and oversight. 
255 Prying loose majority party members from their persuasive President and leadership 
becomes the highest priority. Simplicity in expressing the public's goal in the provision 
becomes vital. Every word in the proposed provision that makes it more of an affront to the 
President and draws more criticism as straitjacketing the conduct of the war becomes a 
vulnerability during those sieges and an obstacle to prying loose those majority party members. 
256 The GAO has long had a lead role in watching over the performance of appropriation 
terms and conditions. For example, during Iran-Contra the GAO ferreted out efforts by the 
Reagan Administration to circumvent the restrictions on Defense Department activity by such 
subterfuges as describing military construction activity as "temporary" work during field 
exercises. 
257 When the CPA transferred sovereignty to the new government of Iraq, the 
Administration took the view that although the function performed by the special inspector 
general would continue, it would abolish the specific post and move the operation into the State 
Department. Thus, the able special inspector general came home. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Some may wonder whether the difficult process of enacting 
appropriation riders intended to speed our exit from Iraq is worth the effort. 
We have seen that the proponents of strong presidential power will have 
elaborate lines of constitutional argument to support their viewpoint. They will 
distinguish away analogies from the legislation of the Vietnam War and the 
Iran-Contra scandal and associate their legal position with great wartime 
Presidents like Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Even if an appropriation rider 
crosses the finish line and becomes law, the President may resist by brushing it 
off or minimizing it. Seemingly, only disappointment and defeat lie in store for 
appropriation rider supporters. 
For most, the answer will consist of the policy substance of the 
provision-that it offers hope of shortening a war they fear will otherwise 
continue without end. Because this Article deals with constitutional processes, 
it focuses on a different value upheld by the process of debate in consideration 
and implementation of such riders. Far more than the public realizes, this is not 
just how politics occurs, this is how our democracy decides about war, and this 
is how our democracy has, over the centuries as well as in recent years, taken 
form. During the struggle of Parliament with the Stuart monarchs, of the 
colonies with their royal governors, and in the Constitutional Convention, a 
recurring object shaped our democracy. It consisted of developing and 
maintaining the process for the people, through their legislature, to decide both 
on making war and on bringing it to an end. The struggles over riders and 
conditions from Reconstruction to the onset of World War II showed that 
neither the President nor Congress had a monopoly on wisdom about military 
policy, and that a democratically acceptable policy could only take form by the 
clash of arguments over riders attached to appropriations and legislation. The 
end of the Vietnam War and the exposure of the Iran-Contra scandal, both 
involving the enactment and implementation of riders, not only salvaged our 
national policies, but strengthened democracy by subjecting those policies to 
the public's wishes expressed in the rider process. 
In sum, Congress has full authority to set terms of withdrawal through 
the use of war funding riders, whether a war has debatable initial authorization, 
like the Vietnam War combat in Cambodia and Laos, or clear initial 
authorization, like the war in Iraq. Congress can define the limits of a limited 
war and can do so by the terms in the funding appropriation. 
We would not be in Iraq if intervention had lacked public support in 
2002-03. And, constitutionally, we need neither stay longer nor employ a 
different policy than what the public wants. If the American public has a will 
to employ riders to speed our exit, the resulting healthy exercise of democracy 
will furnish the way. 
